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The control of Bulk Electric Systems (BES) uses communications, software, and embedded 
systems, which makes BES vulnerable to cyber-physical security attacks. Cyber-Physical security 
attacks occur through cyber elements with the intention to disrupt physical system operations or 
physically damage power devices. Cyber-physical attack mechanisms include targeting the 
communications bandwidth or injecting bad data, which may result in bad data being injected into 
the power delivery system or a component being tricked into executing a seemingly benign 
command that harms the overall system or limits the number of messages that can reach their 
destination.  
The objective of this dissertation is to 1) develop algorithms that capture how bad data 
injection attacks propagate in a power delivery system, 2) develop a tool that can model a bad 
command injection in bulk electric systems, and 3) develop a cyber-physical method and metric 
for quantifying the effect of a cyber-physical attack on bulk electric systems. We begin with a 
discussion of motivating the shift from traditional IT cyber-security to the new paradigm of cyber-
physical security and describe its characteristics. By using power system state estimation, we 
develop a graph-based attack propagation model that simulates a bad data injection attack and 
executes a heuristic defense strategy. Next, we develop a co-simulator that models and simulates 
both the power system and the communication in an integrated manner. This provides a capability 
for analyzing the overall cyber-physical security of the entire system by 1) characterizing system 
behavior under different attack scenarios, and 2) quantifying system cyber-physical security 
through cyber-physical security assessment (CPSA) metrics that provide insight into impact 
analysis of cyber-physical attacks on the system. We develop an attack model and a co-simulation 
framework for simulating the effects of a bad command injection on two bulk electric system test 
xv 
 
cases. We also develop an enhanced visualization prototype for increased operator situational 
awareness of the cyber-physical security status of the BES. The results indicate that modeling and 
simulation (M&S) of cyber-physical security attacks holds promise as a way of studying and 
understanding how cyber-physical security attacks in bulk electric systems affect the system 
components and suggest the need for/the benefit of the implementation of cyber-physical security 
assessment modules into existing control systems to manage such real-world attacks when they 













1.1. Background  
 
The electrical grid is the largest, most complex machine ever created. As a result of continuing 
rapid advancements in information, computing and communication technologies, it is currently 
evolving into the “smart grid.” As shown in Figure 1, the smart grid makes use of ubiquitous 
sensors, high-speed communication networks, and Internet of Things (IoT) connectivity to both 
facilitate grid functions and enable the integration of distributed renewable energy sources and 
energy storage into the grid while ensuring its overall efficiency, reliability, and cyber-physical 
security. Managing and coordinating such a complex system involves huge information and data 
flow across the system. Key technologies such as the supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) and distributed control systems (DCS) provide visibility into and enable efficient and 
intelligent control of grid functions, assets, and resources.  
The traditional electric grid, which is divided into generation, transmission, and distribution 
domains,  is hierarchical in nature. In the emerging smart grid, distributed energy resources (DER) 
such as wind, solar, electric vehicles, demand response and energy storage are transforming 
traditional consumers into prosumers, who, in addition to consuming electricity, can generate their 
own energy and sell it back to the grid. Prosumers range from residential to commercial buildings 
and larger microgrids. SCADA, DCS, remote terminal units (RTUs), merging units, intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs), and phase measurement units (PMUs) in substations throughout the grid 
poll and collate raw field measurements that are then used to estimate the current state of the grid 
through state estimation performed at the control center [1]. The energy management system 
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(EMS), in coordination with the control centers, uses information garnered from these sensors to 
send command and control signals to intelligent electronic devices (IES) and corresponding 
actuation functions to ensure that power generation always matches power demand so that voltages 
are within operational ranges and that, in general, the physical operation of the grid is secure.  
 
 




While conventional power systems are well established, investigating the cyber-physical 
security challenges faced by the smart grid due to advancements in IoT technologies requires first 
understanding what the emerging smart grid actually is. Title XIII of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 highlights ten characteristics of a Smart Grid: 
 (1) Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security,   
      and efficiency of the electric grid.  
(2) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cybersecurity.  
(3) Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including renewable  
     resources.  
(4) Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and energy- 
     efficiency resources.  
(5) Deployment of “smart” technologies (real-time, automated, interactive technologies that  
     optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) for metering,  
     communications concerning grid operations, grid status, and distribution automation.  
(6) Integration of “smart” appliances and consumer devices.  
(7) Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technologies, 
     including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal storage air conditioning.  
(8) Provision to consumers of timely information and control options. 
(9) Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances and  
     equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serving the grid.  
(10) Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart  
      grid technologies, practices, and services. 
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The capabilities highlighted above are enabled by new technologies and components that can 
become targets of a cyber-physical security attack, e.g., attacks that attempt to disrupt the physical 
devices and physical functionality of the power delivery system. A further challenge of securing 
the electric grid is that the energy delivery system is vital and must always continue to deliver 
energy to end-users.  
 
1.2. Context and Motivation  
 
As a result of technological and socioeconomic changes, societies increasingly rely on 
electricity systems to support most of their activities. More devices are being connected to the grid 
at all levels: distributed solar generation to augment traditional generation, IEDs in substations to 
facilitate faster and more efficient delivery of electricity, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) 
meters that give users insight and control of their consumption in home area networks (HANs), 
electric vehicles, and so on. The increased number of connected devices increases the threat surface 
and makes the grid more vulnerable to cyber hackers and insiders looking to compromise outdated 
and poorly protected cyber components. Following are key considerations that have led to cyber-
physical security challenges that the smart grid is facing today: 
• The electrical grid was not built with cyber or cyber-physical security in mind. It was built 
to be reliable with the use of industrial control systems (ICS) that are now decades old and 
cannot be easily updated [2]. In addition, the grid’s evolution has been a fusion of bolt-on, 
patching, and buildouts. This presents challenging security problems as the grid evolves 
from a vertically integrated electric utility model—where one company controls the 




• Multiple players are now involved since power generation has to come from both 
traditional power plants as well as from distributed generation sources simultaneously. 
However, the cyber devices deployed by these multiple players are manufactured by a 
variety of vendors, who implement different communications and security protocols, which 
creates in the smart grid challenging interoperability problems. It is these interoperability 
problems that can create more ways for hackers to access and compromise the smart grid. 
• One way to mitigate the effects of a cyber-attack on the smart grid is to use distributed 
generation, control, and automation. However, this approach also increases the threat 
surface area, since distributed hubs for power generation and control are not as secure as 
centralized control and data centers.  
• Obtaining higher resolution measurements in the new smart grid requires SCADA systems 
to perform more coordination and control of the different players in the grid. These systems 
are currently implemented over wide-area IP networks since many of the key players and 
prosumers are geographically dispersed. As a result of these challenges, malevolent actors 
in cyberspace have more access points through which they can illegitimately access and 
compromise the smart grid.   
In order to properly capture cyber-security aspects in the smart grid, security models have to 
consider not just the cyber threats and risks affecting the communications network but also the 
physical impacts on the power system. Questions regarding how cyber-attacks affect the operations 
of these devices have to be answered. The interactions between the cyber layer and the physical 
layer give rise to the domain of cyber-physical security. The grid is increasingly becoming more 
complex; however, our understanding of its complexities, vulnerabilities, and security dynamics 
is far from complete. Currently, traditional cybersecurity measures are used as preventive 
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countermeasures for the smart grid, which is a cyber-physical system and more than just a 
communication network. However, these traditional cyber-security measures have proved either 
insufficient, inapplicable, or simply ineffective in preventing, detecting, or mitigating cyber-
physical security attacks. Hence, new models, as well as revisions to existing practices must be 
created to provide better countermeasures to meet the cyber-physical security challenges facing 
the smart grid today.  
Recent cyber-physical attacks on electrical grids in various countries have reinforced the 
notion that electric grids are targets of a major cyber attack. To put this into context and help 
highlight the vulnerabilities of the smart grid, Table 1 below presents some of the well-known 
attacks on the industrial control systems: 
Table 1 - Major Cyber Security Attacks on the Energy Sector 
 Aurora  Stuxnet Dragonfly/Havex Sandworm 
Ukrainian Electric 
Utility 
Year 2007 2010 2013 2014 2015 
Scope 
Simulated Attack 





happens when a 
generator is 
remotely controlled 
by hackers  
Physical Damage 
to Iran’s Uranium 
enrichment 
equipment in a 
nuclear facility 














of the  
BlackEnergy 
Trojan 
3 Power Distribution 
substations taken 














- -  - 225,000 
Damage ($) - $5 – 10M  - ~ $10M 
 
The electric grid is core to the functioning of U.S. society. The other sixteen critical 
infrastructures that make up the economy rely heavily on electricity to function properly. The 
potential consequences of a disruptive, destabilizing, or incapacitating cyber attack on the U.S. 
smart grid have motivated the research community, the government, and the energy industry to 
investigate U.S. power grid vulnerabilities and then use the findings to determine and deploy 
mechanisms to minimize the risk of cyber-attacks. 
 
1.3. Research Objective   
 
The complexity of smart grid cyber-physical security, the interactions between the power 
systems and the communications networks, and the computational cost to simulate and assess 
smart grid cyber-physical security attacks call for effective and efficient co-simulation tools. These 
tools will be critical in providing support for operator decisions and improvement in cyber-attack 
defense strategy. Given the above considerations, below are the major objectives for the research 
in this thesis:  
1. Design and implement an attack generation framework for evaluating the impact of cyber-
physical security attacks. 
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2. Characterize system behavior under different attack scenarios. 
3. Implement a flexible and modular design for a cyber-physical security assessment software 
tool. 
4. Characterize and quantify system cyber-physical security through cyber-physical security 
assessment (CPSA) metrics that provide insight into impact analysis of cyber-physical attacks 
on the system. 
5. Develop a visualization prototype that captures real-time system dynamics of cyber-physical 
security. 
Because any testing performed on real power systems would be difficult, expensive, and 
unsafe, the key methodology for studying CPSA will be simulation and analysis. These 
simulations, which will be performed with realistic data, will allow the study of how different 
attacks can be constructed and which assets, if taken down, could have the most impact on the 
system. Because of the inherent complexity in modeling a cyber-physical system by tying the 
communication and power layer together, we must first introduce a few assumptions and limit the 
scope of the problem to be investigated. Below s are the assumptions employed in the design and 
implementation of the CPSA tool: 
1. The evaluation of smart grid cyber-physical security will start from already conducted research 
on constructing undetectable cyber-physical attack models through full or partial knowledge 
of the power system topology with necessary modifications. 
2. Specifically, the approach to the research in this dissertation assumes that the smart grid can 
be modeled as a complex network to which current topological vulnerability metrics from 
complex network studies can be applied.  
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3. The power flow, state estimation, and contingency analysis that are widely used in traditional 
power grids are central to the computational module in the developed CPSA tool. 
4. Because it would be computationally inefficient to replicate a large-scale power system with 
tens of thousands of components with the associated analogs, status points, and controls, we 
adopt a model that simplifies several complex real-time dynamics.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 surveys the literature of the bulk 
electric system vulnerabilities and state-of-the-art approaches for securing such systems against a 
cyber-physical attack. Chapter 3 presents our approach to modeling cyber-physical security in bulk 
electric systems, and Chapter 4 presents an attack-graph propagation model for bad data injection 
into power delivery systems. Chapter 5 presents the modular design of the Cyber-physical Security 
Assessment (CPSA) co-simulator developed in this dissertation. Chapter 6 describes the co-
simulation software framework implementation details, while Chapter 7 presents the cyber-
physical security assessment of different test cases using the CPSA tool. Chapter 8 provides 







This chapter presents a literature survey of several topics relevant to this dissertation. 
Section 2.1 gives a description of the Bulk Electric System (BES) and its constituent 
interconnections and entities. The control and monitoring of the bulk electric system is discussed 
in section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents the cyber-physical security threats and vulnerabilities facing 
bulk electricity delivery. Historical approaches and current trends of securing bulk electric systems 
are discussed in section 2.4, while section 2.5 details existing research work in cyber-physical 
security modeling and simulation and the challenges that exist. This chapter concludes by 
describing the need for bulk electric system cyber-physical security co-simulation.  
 
2.1. Bulk Electric System  
 
The bulk electric system, also known as the power transmission system, is the network of 
interconnected generation and transmission lines designed to transport large amounts of electricity 
over long distances by using high transmission voltages of 110kV and above. The North American 
power network is subdivided into five asynchronous regions, as shown in Figure 2. The five 
synchronous regions are the Eastern and Central United States (including Ontario, Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Manitoba and Saskatchewan of Canada), Quebec and Labrador, the Western 
United States and parts of Western Canada including parts of north-western Mexico, and the 
eastern interconnection and Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) in Texas and the rest 





Figure 2 - NERC Synchronous Interconnections and Regional Entities 
 
When the bulk electric system was first designed decades ago, it was fitted with minimal 
protection using line switches which were sometimes manual. The bulk electric system has 
evolved over the decades. Today, it is equipped with sensors for transmitting information used for 
protection, control, monitoring, and security purposes. At the core of bulk electric system are 
Supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) and energy management systems 
(EMS). 
Cyber-physical security attacks targeting a BES can be designed to affect two main 
domains: the monitoring and data gathering capabilities of SCADA, such as a distributed denial 
of service attack on a remote terminal unit thus preventing it from sending data back to the control 
center, or the computation capabilities of an EMS, which can be compromised through bad data 






2.2. Control and Monitoring of Bulk Electric System  
 
The control and monitoring of BES is done via two main systems: supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) and energy management systems (EMS). SCADA is responsible for 
gathering and sanitizing field measurements, which are then fed into the EMS to perform a 
variety of important grid functions such as power flows and optimal dispatch.  
 
2.2.1. SCADA Systems  
 
SCADA is a type of industrial control system (ICS). Industrial control systems are a 
combination of several types of control systems and instrumentation that monitor and control 
industrial processes that exist in the physical world. SCADA systems are typically different from 
other ICSs because they are large-scale processes that operate across multiple geographic sites. 
The IEEE Std C37.1-1994 [5] defines the SCADA system as a system for remote monitoring and 
control that operates with coded signals over communication channels to acquire information 
about remote equipment for monitoring and control functions.  
SCADA control system architecture provides a means for remotely monitoring and 
controlling industrial systems via data communication between computers. The control system is 
also equipped with human-machine interfaces (HMI) for high-level process supervisory 
management such as issuing generator setpoint change commands. A SCADA system also allows 






Figure 3 - SCADA Network Architecture [6] 
 
As shown in Figure 3, a typical SCADA network consists of the following main constituent 
components: the supervisory system or master terminal unit (MTU), the remote terminal unit 
(RTU), a communications network, and field devices such as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) 
[7]–[9]. The topology of the connection between the SCADA and remote terminal units varies 
depending on the application: it could be one MTU connected to one RTU, which is referred to as 
a single-master single-remote configuration [10], or several RTUs connected to one single-master 
MTU [11]. 
 
• Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 
Remote Terminal Units are real-time microprocessor-controlled electronic devices and are 
the main component in SCADA systems. RTUs have direct connections (either through serial or 
Ethernet ports) to various sensors, meters, and actuators associated with a controlled environment. 
RTUs not only interface field objects to SCADA or distributed control systems (DCS) by 
transmitting field digital and analog telemetry data to the MTU, but also execute commands from 
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the master supervisory system to control field instruments and devices through actuators and 
switch boxes. Typically, RTU equipment has the following functionalities/controls [12]:  




Single indication without / with 24 / with 56 bit timestamps 
Double indication without/ with 24 / with 56 bit timestamps. 
Step position information without / with 24 / with 56 bit timestamps. 
Measured value – normalized, scaled, short floating point without / with timestamps. 
Bit strings of 32 bits without / with timestamps. 
Integrated totals (counters) without / with timestamps. 
Packed events (start & tripping) of protection equipment. 
Single commands. 
Double commands. 
Regulating step commands. 
Set point commands of various data formats. 
Bit string commands. 
Interrogation commands. 
Clock synchronization & delay acquisition commands. 
Test & reset commands. 
 
 
• Master Terminal Unit (MTU) 
The master station or master terminal unit (MTU) is typically located in the control center, 
where the operator interacts with the system through a human-machine interface (HMI). The MTU 
polls the RTUs for data (measurements, field device statuses, etc.) by performing reading and 
writing operations at periodic scanning intervals. It then processes the received data and renders 
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various visualizations of the data. It also performs control, alarming, and networking with other 
nodes and sends operator-initiated command and control signals back to the field devices. A typical 




Figure 4 - A Typical SCADA HMI [13] 
 
• Communications Network  
The communication network of a SCADA system transfers data among central host 
computer servers such as MTUs and the field data interface devices such as RTUs & control 
units. The medium of transfer can be cable, leased lines, Public Switched Telephone Networks, 





• Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) 
Intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) are controllers of power system equipment. IEDs are 
microprocessor-based and receive data from sensors and can issue control commands, for example, 
to trip circuit breakers if they sense anomalies, or to raise/lower the voltage to maintain a target 
setpoint. IEDs include circuit breakers, protective relays, load tap changers, capacitor bank 
switches, etc. IEDs perform not only control functions but also protective functions. IEDs are 
typically designed to support some substation automation protocols such as DNP3 or IEC61850. 
 
• Control Field Equipment 
Control field equipment is the actual hardware components and essentially consists of 
sensors and actuators. The sensors directly detect events or measure changes in a physical quantity, 
such as voltage or current levels, and send the information to the IEDs. Examples include current 
transformers (CTs), potential transformers (PTs), temperature probes, etc. [14]. Actuators, on the 
other hand, are responsible for moving and controlling physical devices, for example, opening, 
closing, activating, or deactivating a circuit breaker. Examples include breakers that energize/de-
energize electrical equipment, tap-changing transformers, excitation controllers, etc. [14].  
 
2.2.2. SCADA Architectures  
 
SCADA systems have evolved in parallel with the growth of computing and networking 
technology through four generations: first generation (monolithic), second-generation 
(distributed), third-generation (network), fourth-generation (internet of things). It is imperative to 
note that SCADA systems have had to evolve as a result of growing control demands. While such 
evolution brings with it operational and economic advantages, the changing architecture of 
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SCADA systems has been a contributing factor to the growing cyber-physical security issues 
facing modem SCADA systems.   
• First Generation: Monolithic 
Early SCADA systems were developed at a time when the prevalent computer technology 
was the mainframe computer. Hence, SCADA systems were stand-alone, hierarchical, and 
centralized and ran on large stand-alone mini-computers with no connectivity to other systems 
since networks and network services were non-existent at the time. The transmission of 
information between the SCADA master station and the RTUs in the field was achieved via 
communication protocols developed by RTU equipment vendors with the sole objective of 
communicating with RTUs in the field. As a result, the communication protocols used were strictly 
proprietary and provided only minimal functionalities to support the required scanning and 
controlling of points within a remote device. The communication links between the RTUs and 
MTUs lacked a high degree of fidelity, and thus communication security was ensured primarily 
through error detection and error correction codes [11]. In the event of a failure of the SCADA 
master station, the first-generation SCADA system used a mainframe system connected to all the 
RTUs as a backup system. 
• Second Generation: Distributed 
The second generation of SCADA systems built upon advancements in system 
miniaturization and Local Area Networking (LAN) technology to exchange information and 
command processing in near real-time across multiple operating stations connected through the 
LAN. The single mainframe SCADA master station was replaced by multiple operating stations, 
each with a specific function. The operating stations shared information with each other in near 
real-time. Each distributed operating station served a different SCADA system function, ranging 
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from operating stations that served as communications processors primarily communicating with 
field devices such as relays and RTUs, to operating stations that provided the human-machine 
interface (HMI) for system operators, to operating stations that served as calculation processors. 
The distribution of individual SCADA system functions across multiple operating stations 
provided more processing capability for the system as a whole than would have been available at 
a single operating station. In addition, since each operating station was a smaller and less expensive 
mini-computer than its predecessors, this reduced the cost compared to that of the first-generation 
SCADA systems. However, because the networks that connected these individual operating 
stations were generally based on LAN technologies and had limited reach, second-generation 
SCADA systems still had to be housed in a single building. Another disadvantage was that the 
network protocols used were still not standardized and were proprietary [11]. While this allowed 
a vendor to optimize its LAN protocol for real-time system applications, it limited the connection 
from other vendors to the SCADA LAN and thus created interoperability issues. As a result, only 
a few people had the technical expertise to manage and secure a SCADA installation. 
• Third Generation: Networked 
This is the current architecture of most present-day SCADA systems. Third generation 
SCADA systems generally communicate using LAN and Wide Area Network (WAN) networks 
via the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). Multiple networked systems 
that share master station functions still exist, as do vendor-proprietary protocols. However, the 
main difference between the second generation and third generation SCADA systems is the 
transition to an open system architecture [11]. As a result, SCADA infrastructures can be deployed 
across a WAN, which eliminates the limitation of vendor-controlled proprietary environments of 
the first two generations of SCADA systems. A major advantage of the networked design is that 
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the SCADA infrastructure can be deployed across different geographic regions and also deployed 
across more than one LAN network. A distributed SCADA architecture with centralized control 
allows for a more cost-effective and reliable large scale system. Distributing the processing across 
different geographical locations keeps the SCADA system operational in the event of a total loss 
of any one location, thus improving the entire SCADA network's reliability. 
• Fourth Generation: Internet of Things  
Fourth-generation SCADA systems are enabled by technological advances in internet of 
things (IoT) technology and cloud computing. These SCADA systems compute and communicate 
various states in real-time by using the scalability of cloud environments to implement complex 
control algorithms that are practically infeasible to implement on traditional programmable logic 
controllers [15]. This allows for easier maintenance and integration of the fourth-generation system 
compared to the previous generations of SCADA systems. Additionally, the use of open network 
protocols such as the transport layer security (TLS) mechanisms in IoT technologies, provides a 





Figure 5 - Evolution of SCADA Systems [16], [17] 
 
2.2.3. SCADA Protocols 
 
SCADA systems need a protocol for transmitting data across multiple nodes, typically 
between the MTU and the RTU. According to the American Gas Association’s AGA-12 standard, 
there are about 150-200 SCADA protocols [18]. Some proprietary vendor-specific SCADA 
protocols include SES-92, Modbus RTU, RP-570, and Profibus. Standard protocols that support 
the open standards include DNP3, IEC 61850, and IEC 60870-5-101 or 104. DNP3 is the most 
widely used protocol for data transport in electricity systems in the US. The work done in this 
dissertation uses the DNP3 protocol in the implementation of a cyber-physical security assessment 
tool. Many of the standardized protocols are designed to operate over TCP/IP. However, it is a 
good security measure to avoid connecting SCADA systems to the internet to reduce the cyber 
threat surface area. DNP is primarily used in North and South America, parts of Asia, South Africa 




Table 3- Some Common SCADA protocols [11] 
 
Protocol Organization Common 
Industries 
Features 
DNP3 Developed by GE 
Harris, Managed by 
the DNP organization  











Gas and Oil and 
electric substations, 
transportation 
Initially developed for 
modicon’s PLCs. 
Open standard and 
royalty-free. Simple 
to implement. Both 
serial and TCO 
version are available. 
Simplicity and wide 










Industrial Automation   









as well as peer to peer  
 
IEC 60870-5 IEC TC57   








2.3. Control and Monitoring of Energy Management System 
 
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system monitors the state of the 
electric power through data transmitted by remote control units (RTUs) to the control center every 
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2-5 seconds. The received data is processed by the state estimator, and the output provides energy 
management system (EMS) operators with situational awareness of the entire system’s current 
operating conditions despite noisy or corrupted measurements. State estimation is one of the vital 
components in the Energy Management Systems (EMS) of power system control centers [19],[20]. 
State estimation involves the optimal estimation of the power system state by using data from 
power meters, sensors, smart meters and system parameters. State estimation also includes 
algorithms for bad data detection and network topology checking to offer robustness against sensor 
faults and line contingencies. State estimation is at the foundation of system monitoring, 
protection, and control. The output of the state estimator is employed for different applications of 
EMS - optimal economic dispatch, contingency analysis, and system operational security 
assessment. 
The electric grid cannot reliably operate without a valid state estimator solution for 
extended periods of time. The 2003 Northeast blackout in the U.S was caused in part by 
convergence issues in the state estimator software as a result of topology errors [21]. The errors 
caused the estimator’s solution to diverge and thus rendered all downstream analysis tools like 
Real-Time Contingency Analysis unusable for hours. This incident emphasizes the importance of 
having an accurate network topology in the EMS. Equally important is having redundancy. 
Redundancy in measurements is important not only for obtaining a valid state estimation (SE) 
solution, but also for identifying bad data and topological errors. Although utilities and ISOs 
maintain high redundancy in measurements, there could be cases such as system islanding or issues 
in data acquisition systems that result from faulty sensors or downed communication links and can 
reduce redundancy to critical levels. In such cases, total system observability cannot be guaranteed 
[22]. The problem of the detection and correction of topology errors has been studied for a long 
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time, but the high exposure of the current SCADA infrastructure and the EMS to cyber threats has 
added a new dimension to the problem. 
 
2.4. Bulk Electric System Cyber-Physical Security Threats and Vulnerabilities  
 
This section discusses the current cyber-physical security threats and vulnerabilities faced 
today by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems as well as the Energy 
Management Systems that contain the computational engine of grid essential algorithms and 
functions essential to a bulk electric delivery system. Several vulnerabilities in SCADA and EMS 








Figure 6 - Vulnerabilities in the Power Grid Exploited by Attack Vectors [23] 
 
 Table 4 - Threats against SCADA Systems [11] 
Threat  Description 
Viruses  A virus is a type of malicious software that replicates itself by 
modifying other non-malicious computer programs and inserting 
its own code when executed. The 2015 and 2016 attack by the 
Stuxnet virus shows that an attack on a SCADA system is 
particularly attractive for hackers because of the significant 
physical damage the attack can cause.  
Worms  Computer worms are stand-alone malware programs that 
replicate themselves through networked computers by exploiting  
software or hardware vulnerability. Worms that target electrical 
systems could disrupt electricity delivery operations.  
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Bot-network operators Bot-network operators are a network of compromised computers 
infected with malicious software and controlled as a group 
without the owner’s knowledge. Botnets can be used to carry out 
DDOS attacks to overload a SCADA network with requests, thus 
stretching out network resources and rendering the network 
inaccessible to its intended users.  
Insider threats (insiders) An insider threat is a security risk that comes from within the 
targeted system or organization. Insider threat can include 
employees, former employees, contractors, or business associates 
who have inside information about the organization’s practices 
and protocols. Insiders have been the main source of computer 
crime 
Hackers  Hackers use computers to gain unauthorized access to data. 
Hackers can exploit SCADA vulnerabilities to take full control of 
critical infrastructure.  
Criminal Groups   Criminal groups such as hostile nation-states can launch cyber 
warfare to create devastating attacks on SCADA systems in the 
US by exploiting known and unknown vulnerabilities in these 
systems. This can be done through several means, some of which 
include phishing emails and network reconnaissance by analyzing 
publicly available information.  
 
 
2.4.1. SCADA System Vulnerabilities  
 
In recent years, cyber-attacks on SCADA and EMS systems such as the Maroochy Shire 
sewage spill attack in January 2000 [24], the Davis-Beese Ohio nuclear power plant attack, the 
Slammer Worm attack in January 2003 [24], the Stuxnet Worm attack on Iranian Nuclear Facilities 
in November 2010 [25], the cyber-attacks on Ukraine’s power grid in December 2015 and 
February 2016 [26], which left 80,000 people in the dark for six hours, have brought more attention 
to BES vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts of cyber-attack on critical power delivery systems. 
The biggest cyber threat to BES and SCADA systems is unauthorized access by an insider 
or disgruntled ex-employee leading to a cyber incident. The United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (US-CERT) released a vulnerability advisory [27] warning that unauthenticated 
users could download sensitive configuration information including password hashes from an 
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Inductive Automation Ignition system by utilizing a standard attack type that leverages access to 
the Tomcat Embedded Web server. Additional threats to unauthorized access to BES and SCADA 
systems are publicly released worms/viruses/Trojans, as described in Table 4, constitute major 
threats to BES and SCADA systems. The information presented in Table 4 was adapted from the 
Department of Homeland Security ICS-CERT’s cyber threat source descriptions presented in [28]. 
In June 2010, the anti-virus security company VirusBlokAda reported the first detection of 
malware that attacks SCADA systems running on the Windows operating systems. The malware 
is called Stuxnet and uses four zero-day attacks to install a rootkit, which in turn, logs into the 
SCADA's database and steals design and control files [29], [30]. The malware is also capable of 
changing the control system and hiding those changes [31]. A vulnerability is a weakness of a 
system that can be used by an adversary, such as an attacker, to compromise one or more of its 
attributes by crossing priviledge boundaries. The most common threat vectors to BES and SCADA 
systems are described in Table 4.  Threats and vulnerabilities in SCADA systems are both historic 












Table 5 - Table of SCADA Equipment Vulnerabilities [32] 
 
Traditional IT security breaches have targeted data and personal information. However, 
ICS cyber attacks target physical processes and assets, specifically the control systems and 
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intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) connected to the electric grid [33]. Since the 1980s, there have 
been almost 800 total ICS cyber incidents globally documented. More than 250 of these cyber 
attacks occurred in 2013, with over 50% of them occurring in electric utilities in North America. 
It is believed that the reported numbers understate the actual cyber attack attempts and cyber 
incidents, primarily because of inconsistent and voluntary ICS cyber incident tracking and 
reporting [34].  As a result, the security of some SCADA-based systems has come into question 
as they are seen as vulnerable to cyber-attacks [24], [35], [36]. More specifically, security 
researchers are concerned about the following issues: 
▪ The lack of concern about security and authentication in the design, implementation, and operation 
of some existing SCADA infrastructures 
▪ The belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of security through obscurity through the use of 
specialized protocols and proprietary interfaces 
▪ The assumption that SCADA infrastructures are secure because they are physically secured 
▪ The assumption that SCADA networks are secure because they are disconnected from the internet 
 
2.4.2. Energy Management System Threats and Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerabilities in today’s electric grid expose the grid to cyber-physical security issues. A 
contributing factor is the ongoing transition of electricity control infrastructure to a cyber-
controlled paradigm. Figure 9 illustrates the traditional real-time control loop implemented 
through EMS systems for bulk electricity delivery. Complex decisions are made automatically 
through the automatic generation control (AGC) system and through human-in-loop (HIL) 
operator decision making. Figure 9 represents the operational paradigm that has successfully 
addressed electricity system operations for several decades. The EMS system ultimately 
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implements a sophisticated control loop of sensing, estimation, optimization and actuation, which 
can be perturbed at any stage by cyber-physical attacks. The EMS can provide different levels of 
feedback, from SCADA-only operation to instantaneous, deterministic optimization through the 
security-constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF). Except for instances of AGC control, all the 
control centers require HIL operation at the core of operational decisions. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Control loop operation of Energy Management System 
 
The authors in [37] published one of the earlier works on cyber-physical attacks, specifically 
bad data injection on power systems’ state estimation. Since then, research interest in this area has 
increased significantly, and several research efforts addressing challenging research problems in 
this domain have been published. The authors in [6] proposed a unified formulation for the problem 
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of constructing attack vectors for linearized measurement models and, using this formulation, 
designed a new low-complexity attacking strategy that significantly outperforms naive relaxation. 
The results demonstrated that it is possible to defend against malicious data injection if a small 
subset of measurements can be made hardened or insusceptible to the attacks. However, selecting 
such subsets is a high-complexity combinatorial problem given the typically large size of electrical 
grids. In [38], the authors explored the effects of data integrity attacks on voltage control devices 
like FACTS, SVC, etc. In [39], a graph theoretic efficient algorithm with polynomial-time 
complexity is designed to implement an unobservable malicious data attack. When the 
unobservable attack can not be implemented due to limitations of meter access, attacks are 
constructed to minimize the residue energy of the attack while guaranteeing a certain level of 
increase of mean square error. Research works exploring the vulnerabilities and threats to EMS 
have been published, with a majority focusing on the simulation of different types of attacks on 
the DC state estimator. Other works have explored cyber-attacks on power system operations like 
AGC, voltage control, state estimation, distribution applications like AMI, and infrastructure 
elements like PDCs. 
 The authors of  [40] implemented a game-theoretic approach to launch attacks in which 
system operators in charge of defending a system act as malicious actors willing to attack the 
system. Work in [22] explores designing and implementing an unobservable attack on a DC state 
estimator. In [41], the authors studied the effect of bad data injection through linear state estimators 
under the assumption that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the power systems topology. Work 
done in [42] determined how many critical measurements attackers needed to have access to to 
minimize their efforts in carrying out an undetectable bad data injection attack. In [43],  the authors 
characterized various attack models that took into account both the attacker’s perfect and imperfect 
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knowledge of the system configuration. In [44], the authors studied economic dispatch infeasibility 
as a result of a cyber-attack by exploring two scenarios to bad data injection and its effect on 
economic dispatch: an opportunistic attack scenario in which an adversary launches an attack in 
an appropriate instance, and a dynamic attack, in which economic dispatch drifts to an undesirable 
state gradually. The authors in [45] showed how a bad data injection attack affects optimal power 
flow (OPF) and could bias the system resulting in higher operations costs. In [38], the authors 
study data injection attacks on state estimation under two scenarios:  random data injection attacks 
and targeted data injection attacks on specific measurements. The results of this work presented 
the probability of finding a suitable attack vector and the computational time required for finding 
an attack vector.  
 Bad data injection attack via an SQL-injection on PMU Data Concentrators is considered 
in [39], [46]. Work in [47] explored the impact of data integrity attacks on the AGC system 
operation and quantify the attack impacts in terms of load-generation imbalance and frequency 
violations. The authors in [48] present a false data injection attack against the state estimation in 
deregulated electricity markets. The results showed that a class of attacks could bypass the bad 
data measurement detecting and lead to profitable financial misconduct by affecting the market 
clearing prices (LMP). Several recent works have explored various aspects of cyber-attacks on 
EMS system function that impact reliable EMS operation. These include modeling  attacks, 
minimizing the number of compromised meters for PMUs, and various detection and mitigation 




2.5. Securing Bulk Electric Systems  
 
Prior efforts and initiatives by several entities to secure BES systems focused on reliability, 
i.e., protecting the system against faults. These entities included balance authorities, utilities, 
independent system operators (ISOs), regional transmission organizations (RTOs), the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC), etc. However, in recent years, these initiatives have expanded to consider and improve 
the system's cyber-physical security. The section discusses three types of initiatives designed 
specifically for securing SCADA and EMS systems: technical, industrial, and government-led.  
Technical Approaches  
Several mechanisms have been developed to secure BES transmission assets, such as EMS 
and SCADA systems. One such mechanism deploys phasor measurement units (PMUs) at different 
locations to protect the system from attackers in advance. Because PMUs measure voltages and 
currents on a power grid by using a common time source that is based on global positioning system 
(GPS) time, they can provide accurately time-stamped measurements for geographically dispersed 
nodes. Another mechanism develops and implements advanced signal processing techniques at the 
control center to identify bad data injection attacks [54]–[56].   
Industrial Approaches  
• The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC):  
NERC is a nonprofit self-regulatory authority that develops and enforces standards to ensure the 
reliability and security of the bulk electric system in North America [57].  The Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), on the other hand, is the agency that regulates both the 
transmission and wholesale sale of electricity and natural gas in interstate commerce as well as the 
operations of regional markets. As a result of growing threats to the energy sector from cyberspace, 
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the security of BES is no longer a certainty. In response to these threats, NERC has developed the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards and submitted them to the FERC for 
approval. The CIP Reliability Standards require certain users, owners, and operators of a BES to 
comply with specific requirements to safeguard critical cyber assets [58]. NERC Standards CIP-
002 through CIP-011, as summarized in Figure 8, provide a cybersecurity framework for 
identifying and protecting Critical Cyber Assets to support reliable operation of the Bulk Electric 
System (BES).  
 
Figure 8 - Current NERC CIP Standards as of March 2016 [34] 
These standards recognize the differing roles of each entity in the operation of the BES, the 
criticality and vulnerability of the assets needed to manage BES reliability, and the risks to which 




• The American Gas Association (AGA):  
AGA has developed practices, protocols, and processes required to protect SCADA 
communications against cyber incidents [60]. The main focus of the AGA security initiatives is to 
ensure the confidentiality of SCADA communications. 
 
Government-Led Approaches  
• The Department of Energy (DOE):  
The DOE has established the national SCADA testbed program [INL] and developed a 10-year 
roadmap for securing control systems in the energy sector [61] with the following four main 
objectives: (1) measure current security, (2) develop and integrate protective measures, (3) detect 
intrusion and implement response strategies, and (4) sustain security improvements.   
• Sandia National Laboratories:  
Sandia established the Center for Control System Security with the objective of modeling, 
designing, simulating, verifying, and validating problems and challenges encountered in real-
world critical infrastructures [62]. The center’s findings are integrated into research efforts that 
focus on solving current control system security problems and developing next-generation control 
systems.   
• Working Groups:  
Working groups, such as the collaboration between Hart and the ISA, have been established to 
facilitate the adoption, implementation, and standardization of wireless sensor networks in 
SCADA control systems. They also work to configure hop-by-hop and end-to-end confidentiality 
and integrity mechanism in the wireless communication protocol while providing the necessary 
protocols for access control and key management [61], [63]. 
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A combination of authentication, encryption, and access control have been employed as the main 
techniques in electric power systems to safeguard IEDs, PLCs, RTUs, controllers, communication 
processors, and SCADA systems against cyber-attacks. Several cyber-attack mitigation tools 
implementing a combination of these techniques. Table 6 captures a snapshot of technologies to 
safeguard SCADA network equipment [32]. 
Table 6 - Mitigation Tools and Techniques [32] 
 
Once the vulnerabilities of modem SCADA systems for bulk electric power systems have been 
explored, they then need to be secured/protected. One approach that has been applied to protecting 
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SCADA systems is to deploy traditional network security technologies. However, because 
SCADA systems and traditional IT systems are different, applying traditional IT cyber-security 
measures to SCADA systems is often ineffective or simply inapplicable. The differences between 
traditional IT systems and SCADA/EMS systems were first presented in [11] and are re-adapted 
here in Table 7, as shown below. 
Table 7 - Difference between Traditional IT Systems and SCADA  
Category  Traditional Information 
Technology Systems  
SCADA Systems  
Performance  High throughput can tolerate 
delay and jitter 
Medium to low throughput  
cannot tolerate delay or jitter  
Focus of Security 
Architecture 
Protection is focused on the 
central core of the system, so-
called “hard in the middle and 
soft on the outside”  
Need to protect the edges or 
perimeter devices such as 
RTUs and field devices. Also 
need to protect core internal 
systems as well 
Priority of security 
primitives (Priority in 
ascending order) 
1. Confidentiality  
2. Integrity  
3. Availability 
1. Availability  
2. Integrity  
3. Confidentiality  
 
Component Lifetime  3 – 5 years  15 – 20 years  
Physical Accessibility  Easily accessible Isolated and remote, may be 
very difficult to access  
Protection focus  Protect data – intellectual 
property, credit card, personal 
identifiable information (PII) 
Protect process – protect the 
protection, control, and 
monitoring process  
Communication protocols  TCP/IP Suite – TCP, IP, 
UDP, DNS, DHCP etc.  
ISO27000 
Over 1000 protocols – Most 
popular are Modbus, DNP3, 
PROFINET.PROFIBUS, 
OPC etc.  
Control mechanism  Programmable Logic 
Controllers not common  
Programmer Logic 
Controllers are the backbone 
of SCADA/ICS Systems 
control process [64] 
System downtime  Tolerated  Not acceptable  
Interoperability Not Critical  Critical  







2.5.1. Securing SCADA and EMS with standard IT Technologies  
 
Two ways to keep SCADA systems secure are to provide good network segmentation by 
firewalls or with a virtual LAN (VLAN)  [11]. In [38], Munshi discusses applying encryption to 
protect against spoofing commands and access to data of field equipment such as PLCs and RTUs; 
employing IPSEC to protect unsecured communications that may be traveling over unsecured 
shared networks; adopting operating system hardening, patch management, network equipment 
access control, server access controls, physical security, virus protection strategy, and user 
authorization to prevent access to the control center; using network controls like firewalls, proxy 
servers, and network segmentation to protect against unscrupulous access to remote SCADA 
clients, ERP systems, and corporate users of SCADA data, and web services.  
The use of modems for remote access to SCADA systems makes it an easy target by 
creating multiple network entry points. Password-protected modems and encrypting modems were 
solutions recommended by Oman, et al. [32]. Permann and Rohde [11] discussed using well- 
established traditional IT network scanning and vulnerability assessment tools like Nmap, Nessus, 
and Ethereal for security assessment of SCADA control systems. Dolezilek et al. explored secure 
substation information system installation that uses standard  IT technologies in [65]. Abshier [66] 
summarized ten important design and process principles for securing control systems:  governance, 
security awareness and training, policies and procedures, change management, security 
architecture, adding devices and remote access, vulnerability, risk assessment and penetration 
tools, incident response, configuration and patch management, and monitoring. Some additional 
strategies for building a security plan for securing SCADA systems with traditional IT 
technologies are given in [67]. Comprehensive guidelines for designing and implementing secure 
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SCADA systems and control networks are also being developed by several industry organizations 
and commissions.  
 
2.6. Current SCADA and EMS Cyber-Physical Research Challenges  
 
Over the past several years, industry groups and academics have begun to work towards 
addressing SCADA security issues. This can be seen in the increasing number of publications 
related to SCADA security [68], [69]. The following are a number of identified research challenges 
in the area of cyber-physical security for bulk electric systems: 
• Improve access controls to SCADA networks to make it harder for attackers to gain access to 
the SCADA network. 
• Improve security inside SCADA networks, including developing efficient monitoring tools 
that make carrying out an attack difficult. 
• Improve the security management of the SCADA network.  
• Develop advanced signal processing techniques at the control center to identify bad data 
injection attacks  
• Develop advanced statistical methods for efficient and reliable bad data detection  
• Design correction techniques for bad data injection attacks  
Solutions to these challenges must take into consideration the unique demands of SCADA 
and EMS systems, and these challenges will be resolved through a combination of developing 
better trust management protocols, advanced algorithms for bad data detection, and novel co-





2.7. The Need for Bulk Electric System Cyber-Physical Security Co-Simulation   
 
Efforts by research and industry to design cyber-physically secure power grids are constrained 
by the availability of realistic cyber-physical environments. Hence, the research and development 
of cyber-physically secure grids will depend heavily on the availability of representative 
environments such as co-simulators and testbeds where current solutions and future ideas can be 
implemented, tested, and extensively verified. Real-world applications require prototype 
implementations. This allows for safe and fast verification of concepts that can facilitate research 
results that can be transferred to the power system industry. Co-simulators and testbeds which 
integrate SCADA hardware, EMS software, and emulation and simulation techniques to provide 
an accurate electric grid cyber-physical infrastructure need to be developed in the following areas: 
1. Cyber-Physical Security Attack Models Development  
2. Cyber-Physical Attack Impact Analysis  
3. Cyber-Physical Security Metrics  
4. Enhanced Operator Visualization 
5. Mitigation Research  
6. Vulnerability Research  
7. Security Validation  
8. Interoperability  
9. Cyber Forensics  
10. Operator Training  
The work in this dissertation focuses on objectives (1) – (4). One of the earliest research efforts to 
design a security-oriented testbed that addressed some of the objectives above is presented in [70]. 
Sandia National Laboratory developed the Virtual Control System Environment (VCSE) to 
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investigate SCADA vulnerabilities of energy systems [70]. The goal of the testbed was to enhance 
wide-area situation awareness by developing and analyzing possible cyber attacks. The power 
system simulator was integrated with simulated RTUs and HMIs to emulate cyber-attack scenarios 
such as MIMTM, insider attacks. VCSE utilized the DNP3 and Modbus protocols and uses 
OPNET System-in-the-Loop emulation to allow for the integration of network devices into the 
simulated network. The tool was designed to provide support for operator training, vulnerability 
exploration, mitigation development, and attack evaluation. Table 8 below provides a list of 
security-oriented simulators and testbeds that have been built to date.  
Today, we have access to a number of power system simulators: PowerFactory, 
PowerWorld, DigSilent, Matlab/Simulink. Communication network Simulators include OPNET, 
OMNET++, NS2, NS3 as well as hybrid simulators such as GridSim. Most platforms involve the 
combination of several dedicated simulators or hybrid platforms to achieve a co-simulation 
environment. In some of the testbeds, actual data acquisition and sensor/actuator components are 
integrated with power system simulators by using middleware to enable hardware-in-the-loop 
(HIL) simulations. 
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GRID CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY MODEL 
 
3.1. Electric Grid Cyber-Physical Security 
Electric grid cyber-physical security can be defined as the ability of the grid to not be 
operationally disrupted or physically damaged through a cyber-attack. We adopt a cyber-physical 
system (CPS) and Internet of Things (IoT) devices approach, one that tightly couples computing, 
information, and communication technologies (ICT) with physical power system apparatuses and 
system operations. Cyber-physical security presents new concerns that require new approaches 
and solutions. Traditional cyber-security approaches and measures are either deficient, 
insufficiently scalable, unsuitable, or simply inadequate to tackle the challenges posed by the 
highly complex cyber-physical security concerns in emerging grid environments [90].  
Cyber-physical attacks attempt to perturb grid operations by compromising the cyber layer by 
incapacitating communications devices and/or making communications resources unavailable 
[91]. This can cause disruptions in the topology of the communication network, communication 
and controlling devices in the network and in the field, which  impacts the following aspects of 
communication performance:   
a) Link baud rate. 
b) Propagation time or delay. 
c) Maximum number of packets that can be sent without major collision or packet dropping. 
d) Maximum allowable size of each packet.  
However, the effect of these attacks transcends the cyber layer, as the goal of cyber-physical 
attacks is to actually compromise power system operations and damage power devices. Grid cyber-
physical attack mechanisms range from traditional cyber-attacks, such as man-in-the-middle [92], 
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denial-of-service [93], replay  [94], and impersonation [95], to bad data injection, malicious 
command injection, and coordinated denial-of-service on Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). The 
current state and overall health of the power system can also be affected by attacks over the 
communication network, including delay attacks, synchronous flood attacks, and distributed 
denial-of-service attacks on devices. During these attacks, the power system may undergo various 
state transitions and eventually enter an operationally insecure state, in which various physical 
quantities such as power flows exceed established operating limits, voltages are lower than normal, 
and some loads are disconnected.  
It is physically impossible to protect all the assets of a large complex cyber-physical system 
such as the electric grid against a cyber-physical security attack. Consequently, there arises the 
need to develop methods, algorithms, and measures that can detect and counter cyber-physical 
attacks. Traditional IT cyber-security, although mature, is not equipped to capture the potential 
consequences of attacks on physical systems. Although system theory deals with concepts such as 
the performance, stability, and safety of physical systems, its theoretical framework, while well 
consolidated, does not provide a model applicable to cyber-physical systems. As a result, a new 
security concept, namely cyber-physical security is required. By bringing together cybersecurity 
and system theory, Cyber-Physical Security makes possible, a holistic security assessment of a 
cyber-physical system. Unlike the traditional security assessment of just a single domain, i.e., 
either the power system operational security alone or the communication network cyber-security 
alone, Cyber-Physical Security is capable of integrating dynamic systems and threat models within 




3.2. Cyber-Physical Security Attack Modeling  
We develop a framework for cyber-physical security attack modeling, as shown in Figure 9. 
The two main approaches to cyber-physical attacks on bulk electric systems are bad command 
injection and bad data injection. The model developed in this dissertation is a feedback control 
model in which a bad command injected into the BES is executed by actuators, which can have 
serious consequences for the operation of the system. The second aspect explores the attacker 
manipulating legitimate sensor measurements through a bad data injection attack. The details of 
the bad data injection attack are discussed in the next chapter, while this chapter explores the 
functional requirements and use case scenarios for bad command injection simulation, which will 
be further discussed in later chapters. 
 
 




3.3. Functional Requirements of Cyber-Physical Security Assessment (CPSA) Co-simulator 
Technically, the tool must contribute to research and educational learning as well as technical 
and non-technical analysis by electric utility staff. The tool should do the following: 
1. Provide monitoring and situational awareness capabilities to the operators and system 
administrators.  
2. Detect and analyze possible electricity disruptions that can occur in the system as a result of a 
specific cyber-attack.  
3. Enhance the security and resilience of the power system by identifying and assessing the state 
of the cyber-physical system and then suggest appropriate operator actions under attack 
scenarios. 
4. Generate historical logs and cyber-physical security metrics for different power and 
communication components and identify weak elements in the system to help operators 
respond quickly when a similar situation occurs at other locations. 
5. Apply user-generated rules for the normal operating range to provide a better understanding of 
the behavior and normal state of the integrated cyber-physical system.  
 
3.4. Use Case Scenarios for CPSA 
A malicious actor can perform a malicious command injection attack by sending a false 
control command to a substation RTU. If the adversary does not have complete knowledge of the 
system and simply injects a false command at random, the operator should be able to identify and 
stop the execution of the malicious command on the power system. However, if the adversary has 
partial or complete knowledge of the system, it can purposefully inject a specific malicious 
command to maximize the damage in the system at large. One example of a malicious command 
that could significantly impact the power system is the opening of the circuit breaker connected to 
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a generating power plant. The next section describes three specific use case scenarios through 
which a legitimate but unwanted/bad command can be injected into the cyber-physical power 
system.  
 
3.4.1. Use Case 1: Adversary Impersonates Network 
Use Case 1 Description: The adversary impersonates the network and sends a false 
(unwanted) but legitimate command outside of the control center to the circuit breaker of the 
largest generator. 
Communication Network under Attack: The communication network enables the following 
processes following the attack: 
I. The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) notifies the control center operator of what 
command it has received. The operator verifies whether the command is legitimate 
II. A false command is then issued to the substation RTU connected to the breaker of the 
targeted generator. 
Power System under Attack: If the attack is successful, we can observe the following impacts 
on the power system: 
I. An insecure operational state of the power system, 
II. Possible shedding of electrical load 
Use Case Steps: 
1)   The attacker sends a false but legitimate command from a location other than the control  
             center to the generator breaker over an insecure network. 
2)   The IDS detects a suspicious, malicious command based on its rules engine based on IP  
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Addresses and port numbers and then notifies the operator. The operator verifies that the 
control center did not issue the command. 
3)    If the command was allowed to go through, CPSA evaluates the effect of the command on 
the power system and discovers that the system is insecure, indicating that the command 
was malicious. 
4)   The operator discards the command. Secure system operation is restored. 
 
3.4.2. Use Case 2: Adversary Fabricates Legitimate Command  
Use Case 2 Description: Adversary fabricates or modifies a legitimate command sent to a 
generator breaker over an insecure network. 
Communication Network under Attack: Same as in Use Case 1, except that the legitimate 
command was modified during transmission over the network. 
Power System under Attack: Same as in Use Case 1. 
Use Case Steps: 
1)  The adversary modifies a legitimate command transmitted from the control center to the 
generator breaker over an insecure network. 
2)  The IDS does not detect the command modification, but still sends a notification to the 
operator. The operator verifies that the control center did not issue the command. 
3)  Same as Use Case 1, step 3. 
4)  CPSA asks IT personnel for attack information with a response that there is suspicion of a 
MITM attack. 




3.4.3. Use Case 3: Adversary as an insider attacker  
Use Case 3 Description: Adversary as an insider attacker (other person) at the control center 
sends a legitimate but unwanted command to the generator breaker. 
Communication Network under Attack: The operator receives a command notification from the 
IDS and finds the transmitted legitimate command was not issued by him/her. In the worst-case 
scenario, the operator ignores the notification and allows the execution of the command on the 
power system. 
Power System under Attack: Same as in Use Case 1. 
Use Case Steps: 
1)  The adversary acts as an insider attacker who has access privileges for sending a legitimate 
command to the generator breaker. 
2)  The IDS does not detect the insider attack and notifies the operator that it is a legitimate 
command. The operator verifies that the received command is the same as what was issued 
from the control center. 
3)  The generator breaker receives a false trip command and trips. 
4)  CPSA determines that the system is insecure, indicating that the command was legitimate but 
false (unwanted). 
5)  CPSA asks the IT personnel for attack information, receives the response that there is suspicion 
of an insider attack, and prompts the operator to reclose the breaker. 
6)  If the breaker does not respond within 20 seconds, CPSA will prompt the operator to initiate 




3.5. Challenges  
Several challenges exist in modeling bulk electric systems (BES) cyber-physical security. 
During a cyber-physical attack such as a bad command injection, the power system may undergo 
various state transitions and eventually become insecure. Following are three specific challenges 
that make investigating cyber-physical system security difficult: 
I. Scalability: due to the involvement of a large number of power and cyber devices 
II. Limitations of the simulation tool: existing simulation tools are purpose-specific for power 
and communications networks, not designed for integrated operation.  
III. Modeling the behavior of the physical system as impacted from cyberspace is not straight 
forward and requires expertise in both domains. 
 
3.6. Cyber-Physical System Topology   
The cyber-physical test systems developed for this dissertation consist of two layers – the 
communications network layer and the bulk electric system layer. The communication network 
topological structure of the cyber-physical system is shown in Figure 10. The communications 
network consists of a single control center with an EMS, where a power systems operator makes 
operation and control decisions, and 24 substations. The bulk electric system (BES) is shown in 
Figure 11. The communications network topology shown in Figure 10 was integrated with the 
BES in Figure 11 to form the cyber-physical BES test system shown in Figure 12. Test power 
systems were developed using the PowerWorld simulator as shown in Figure 12. Three different 
cyber-physical power systems were designed and tested using the same architecture. A table data 
structure was developed to hold the power system component parameters as shown in Figure 19. 
These parameters are used to re-initialize the power system after every simulation run. Table 9 
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captures the communication network parameters set during the co-simulation runs, while Figure 
19 shows the network communication log developed to include the routing table and events for 
the communications between the RTU and control center.  
 
 
Figure 10- Communication network topology consisting of a single control center and multiple 





Figure 11 - Bulk Electric System Topology 
 





BRANCH Tue 2016.05.03 at 03:17:25 PM EDT 
BusNum BusNum:1 Line Circuit Line Status LineMW LineMVR 
1 7 1 Closed  -21.04 -0.37 
2 3 1 Closed 10.20337 -0.14802 
5 2 1 Closed 5.13083 -0.05707 
5 2 2 Closed 10.20168 -0.05522 
3 4 1 Closed 10.20168 -0.00341 
5 6 1 Closed 8.832336 2.949891 
 
Figure 13 - Sample Metadata for Bulk Electric System Branches 
 
GEN Tue 2016.05.03 at 03:17:25 PM EDT 
BusNum GenID GenStatus GenMW GenMWR GenVoltSet 
10 4 Closed  49.85 -22.3874 1 
11 5 Closed 48.2 -22.3874 1 
12 6 Closed 149.43 -86.7907 1 
13 7 Closed 207.021 24.43159 1.0348 
14 8 Closed 100 138.7 1.0348 
15 8A Closed 100 123.5 1.0348 
 




BUS Tue 2016.05.03 at 03:17:25 PM EDT 
BusNum BusName BusPUVolt BusRad 
1 3SHILLAEC 1.014889 0.538019 
2 3ELSNRSW 1.016529 0.542856 
3 3ELSNR J 1.016344 0.541792 
4 3ELSANOR 1.016179 0.540943 
5 6ELSNRSW 1.016559 0.546357 
6 6SILVER 6 1.015285 0.544642 
 
Figure 15 - Sample Metadata for Bulk Electric System Buses 
 
TRANSFORMER Tue 2016.05.03 at 03:17:25 PM EDT 
BusNum BusNum:1 LineCircuit LineStatus LineTap 
5 2 1 Closed  1 
5 2 2 Closed 1 
6 7 1 Closed 1 
6 7 2 Closed 1 
8 9 1 Closed 1 
28 10 1 Closed 1 
 




LOAD Tue 2016.05.03 at 03:17:25 PM EDT 
BusNum LoadID LoadStatus LoadMW LoadMVR 
1 A1 Closed  21.04 0.37 
4 A1 Closed 10.19974 0.112085 
7 1 Closed 15.15717 0.402403 
9 1 Closed 13.34872 0.513412 
12 E6 Closed 1.856063 1/187481 
13 EC Closed -12.1796 -9.14255 
 
Figure 17 - Sample Metadata for Bulk Electric System Loads 
 
SHUNT  Tue 2016.05.03 at 03:17:25 PM EDT 
BusNum ShuntID SSStatus 
6 1 Open 
21 1 Open 
23 1 Open 
24 1 Open 
27 1 Open 
28 1 Open 
 




Each substation contains an RTU by design. The communication between the RTUs and the 
control center is provided through two routers (Router 1 and Router 2). In Figure 12, the blue lines 
are the communication links used for data transport between the control center and the substations, 
and the orange lines are the transmission lines.  
Table 9 - Communication Network Parameters 
Parameters  Range Value  Unit  
Baud Rate  100 – 9600  Bits/s  
Propagation Delay  10-500  Ms  
Packet Size  50 – 500  Bytes  




Figure 19 - Example Communication Event Log at Routers 
 
Each substation is equipped with many power and field devices, including circuit breakers for 
connecting and disconnecting power components, transmission lines for carrying power from 
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generators to load centers, buses for connecting generators to loads, generators for producing 
power energy, loads for consuming required power demand, transformers for stepping up/down 
the voltage as needed, and shunt capacitor banks for maintaining the power system voltage. The 
control center polls each substation’s RTU to send its available measurement data. All polled 
RTUs send their data back to the control center as a response. In practice, this communication 
sometimes takes place over encrypted communication channels dedicated to a utility’s substation 
data transport. However, some internal substation communication networks may be insecure and 
unencrypted, and as a result, it is likely that an adversary can modify the measurement data before 
it leaves the substation and/or send malicious commands to breakers from the substation.  
 
3.7. Cyber-Physical Security Attack Framework 
This section presents the attack framework developed for modeling a bad command injection. 
Traditionally, operational real-time security assessment of BES involves only contingency 
analysis and worst-case scenario modeling, as shown in Figure 20, without considering 




Figure 20 - Conventional Operational Security Assessment 
However, the developed CPSA framework bridges the gap in security analysis by adopting a 
cyber-physical security approach to security assessment. The framework allows for the execution 
of a malicious command injection attack and assessment of the impact of the command execution 
on the power system by using the CPSA co-simulator, as shown in Figure 21. An adversary sends 
a malicious command encapsulated in a DNP3 packet from the control center (as an insider 
attacker) or from any other location (with a different IP address or spoofed IP pretending to be a 






Figure 21 - Cyber-Physical Security Analysis 
 
In this scenario, the IDS notifies the operator of the malicious command and instructs the operator 
to confirm whether that command is legitimate or not. Once the operator receives the malicious 
command attack information, it uses the co-simulator to model the malicious command injection 
in near real-time and decides whether to execute the command on the actual system. Descriptions 
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of the various components of the attack framework and their interdependencies are discussed in 
the following subsections.  
 
3.7.1. WLS State Estimation Problem Formulation 
State estimation is a data processing algorithm for converting redundant meter readings and 
other available information into an estimate of the state of an electric power system. The weighted 
least squares state estimator is implemented in the co-simulator. The formulation is presented here. 
Let 𝑧 represent a set of power system measurements. Then, 𝑧 = ℎ(𝑥) + 𝑒, where 𝑥 is the estimated 
state vector (bus voltages and angles), ℎ is the vector of functions relating the state variables to the 
error-free measurements, and 𝑒 is a vector of measurement errors, which are assumed to have a 
Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2. 
The WLS estimator minimizes the objective function 
 𝐽(𝑥) = [𝑧 − ℎ(𝑥)]𝑇𝑅−1[𝑧 − ℎ(𝑥)] (4.1) 
where 𝑅 is a diagonal matrix of the measurement error variances. To obtain the minimum 𝑥, we 






𝑅−1 (𝑧 − ℎ(𝑥(𝑘))) (4.1) 





By applying the Gauss-Newton method [96], we obtain the Normal Equations  
 [𝐺(𝑥(𝑘))]Δ𝑥(𝑘+1) = −𝑔(𝑥(𝑘)) (4.2) 








 𝑅−1𝐻(𝑥(𝑘)) (3.4) 
 
Then, we iteratively solve for x until a convergence tolerance 𝜀 is reached. 
 
3.7.2. System Observability Analysis  
The state estimator’s performance relies on the quality, availability, and integrity of 
measurements, which in turn relies on substation sensing and communications devices. 
Observability analysis checks whether the availability of measurements is enough to estimate the 
power system state. If there are enough measurements to estimate the power system state,  the 
system is considered observable [96]. A power system is said to be fully observable if the voltage 
phasors at all system buses can be uniquely estimated with the use of the available measurements. 
If the system is found not to be observable, this will suggest that there are unobservable branches 
whose power flows cannot be determined. Unobservable branches connect observable islands of 
an unobservable system. Typically, observability is done via two methods: topological analysis 
and numerical analysis. Here, we present the formulation for the numerical observability analysis 
used in the implementation of the cyber-physical co-simulator. Using the decoupled linear 
measurement model 
𝐻𝐴𝐴𝜃 = 𝑧𝐴  (4.5) 
 





𝑇 𝑧𝐴 (4.6) 
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If 𝐻𝐴𝐴𝜃 = 0 and 𝑃𝑏 = 𝐶𝜃 ≠ 0 , then 𝜃 will be an unobservable state, where 𝑃𝑏 , the vector of 
branch flows, is obtained from the dc power flow, and 𝐶 is the reduced branch-bus incidence 
matrix. If 𝑃𝑏(𝑖) ≠ 0 for a branch 𝑖, then i will be called an unobservable branch. Below are the 
steps for implementing the numerical observability analysis algorithm: 
1. Remove all irrelevant branches. 




3. If 𝐺𝐴𝐴 is nonsingular, the system is declared fully observable; otherwise, the 
unobservable branches will be found as described above.  
4. Remove the unobservable branches and all injections that are incident at the 
unobservable branches.  
5. Go to Step 1 
 
3.7.3. System Contingency Analysis  
 Contingency Analysis (CA) simulates the outage for a given set of power grid elements 
(typically transmission lines) under a given condition and evaluates the consequent events 
following the outage [97], [98]. CA methods assess the redundancy of power grids in the event of 
outages of some of the components and conclude that a grid is N - k secure if it can remain within 
a stable operation domain when k components are put in an outage situation.  After the DC power 
flow was performed, and the Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) and Line Outage 





obtain DC single solution for base case  
compute PTDF’s, LODF’s  
         for each contingency do 
 compute post contingency flows  
 report limit violations  
        end  
 
3.8. Key Assumptions  
Following are the key assumptions of the attack framework: 
System Susceptibility: The adversary can perform suspicious and/or malicious activities, including 
attempts to access the login credentials of the operator and/or device, transmission of fake/bad 
commands, such as opening a circuit breaker connected to a substation device, and disturbing 
network communications and packet data. The adversary will attempt to discover and exploit these 
susceptibilities in order to compromise (modify, control, or steal) critical power system 
infrastructure, information, and operations. 
Adversary’s Capability: The adversary is capable of performing a MITM attack by altering or 
replacing a legitimate command, injecting a malicious command, or accessing the control center 
to send a legitimate command as an insider attacker. 
Adversary’s Accessibility: The adversary has knowledge of the communication network topology 
as well as the power system topology. The adversary also has enough resources to perform the 
required malicious or suspicious actions and has access to the system. 
Critical Components: The primary goal of the adversary is to target critical power components, 
such as generators and transformers, in order to damage the power system or cause a service 
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interruption. The adversary could also target the routers to explore and access the communication 
system and exploit vulnerabilities. The goal of the power operator is to prevent adversary access 
to critical components by performing regular security analysis to detect any suspicious activity and 
deny illegitimate access. 
Key Assets: Key assets are the pieces of critical information that the adversary will seek. These 
key assets could be information about a regular schedule for polling operations at a specific 
substation or the IP address and other communications-related information for the control center. 
With these assets, the adversary can later spoof the control center and try to inject a malicious 
command. The objective is to identify this malicious activity and prevent such injections in the 
real power system. 
Detection, Reaction, and Adaptation: In the worst-case scenario, the adversary successfully 
performs an undetected malicious action, such as injecting a malicious command. Our objective is 
to simulate the worst-case scenario and analyze the potential impact of the malicious command. 
 
3.9. Cyber-Physical Security Metrics 
The development of a cyber-physical security metric is imperative for CPSA analysis, cyber-
physical attack countermeasures, and increased grid resiliency. Cyber-physical security metrics 
must combine a variety of domains. In the physical bulk electric system domain, metrics can be 
evaluated based on the impact of cyber-physical attacks on power flow and stability. In the 
communication network domain, the metric can incorporate parameters such as communication 
link failure and vulnerability path installation rates [79].  
Several metrics have been developed to assess power grid cyber-physical security. A 
security-oriented stochastic risk management technique called CPIndex was executed on 
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individual host systems to dynamically capture and profile low-level system activities such as 
inter-process communications among operating power system assets, as demonstrated in [99].  
To make cyber-physical security metrics more robust, some work has included humans in 
the loop. In [100], EliMet uses an automated inference technique based on a system administrator’s 
responsive behavior to actively query operators regarding those states for which sufficient 
information was not gained during initial passive observation. It then uses the estimated security 
measure values for predictive situational awareness by ranking potential cyber-physical 
contingencies that the security administrator should plan for when operating the power system 
Security indices are used by utility operators to assess the status of power grids. The indices 
indicate whether the system will operate within an acceptable margin during contingencies or 
whether preventive actions are required to maintain system security. Calculating a security index 
requires developing an inner loop that should be iterated over credible contingencies.  The inner 
iteration is then implemented for defined contingencies, and the security metric will be calculated 
and presented visually to inform system operators about the system status.  A metric called the 
Aggregate Megawatt Contingency Overload (AMWCO) which is used to evaluate the system’s 
security, is implemented in the co-simulator. The AMWCO determines measures and quantifies 
how much the transmission lines are overloaded as a result of a cyber-physical attack. The 
formulation for the AMWCO is presented here. First, the Aggregate Percentage Contingency 
Overload (APCO) is calculated as 
𝐴𝑃𝐶𝑂𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻 𝑗𝑘 = ∑ (%𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 − 100)
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 
𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ 𝑗𝑘
  (4.7) 
 
The AMWCO for each branch is then calculated by using the APCO asy 
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𝐴𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑂𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻 𝑗𝑘 = 𝐴𝑃𝐶𝑂𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻 𝑗𝑘 ∗ 𝑀𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻 𝑗𝑘  (4.8) 
 
The AMWCOs across all branches are summed up to give the system wide AMWCO:  
𝑆𝑦𝑠𝐴𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑂 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑂𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐻 𝑗𝑘 
𝑗𝑘∈𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚
 






3.10. Intrusion Detection System 
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS) deployed at each substation scans every DNP3 
packet sent and received by the substation RTU. The IDS also notifies the operator about each 
control command it receives and then requests verification.   IDS implementation can be performed 
with the use of Suricata [101], which is an open-source implementation and provides rich 
functionality for a customized IDS system. Suricata evaluates functions on network messages and 
performs DNP3 deep packet inspection. The rules of the IDS are developed by using Domain 
Specific Language (DSL), which uses binary-valued functions. The IDS functionality (such as 
verifying read and write DNP3 commands) is modeled through JavaScript Object Notation 
(JSON), which provides specific classes, groups, and identifiers to represent the rules. The IDS 
scans the received DNP3 packet from the Distributed State Estimator (DSE) [102], triggers the 
specific rule based on filters applied to the packet, and passes it to the control center if the packet 
is not malicious. If the packet is suspected to be malicious, the IDS sends a notification (an alarm) 
to the control center. The IDS combines signature and behavioral analysis to protect the system 
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against known, unknown, and advanced threats. Detecting suspicious behavior involves several 
factors, such as measurement data threshold, protocol modifications, and tracking IP addresses and 
port numbers. In this research, we also perform a traffic analysis on received packets by using 
Wireshark with the jpcap/WinPcap tool. We also examine the communication patterns over 
several nodes (RTUs, control center ports, and routers). The process is carried out over an extended 
period of several days as opposed to micro-examination since the IDS alerts on specific protocol 
patterns tend to generate many false positives. To prevent data exfiltration, we ensure strict IT 
controls for both physical and cyber-security. We use data leak and loss prevention to expose the 
egress traffic carrying unauthorized critical information. We also impose strong policies for role-
based and attribute-based access control, and encryption for securing last-mile communications 
[103]. 
 
3.11. Contributions and Conclusion  
 Section 3.7 presented the development of a new framework for assessing electric grid 
cyber-physical security, which makes the following contributions: 
1. A heuristic for power system monitoring and control.  
2. A methodology for accessing electric grid cyber-physical security in the case of contingencies 
caused by a bad command injection attack. 
3. A metric for quantifying the impact of bad command injection attack.  
The framework is robust in that in the case of an attack, and it flags a malicious command as 
suspicious by the IDS. Even if the IDS does not detect the malicious command, and the command 
is executed on the real system, this approach can detect the power system disturbance and report 
the effect to the operator, who can then take appropriate actions (such as sending other control 
68 
 
commands) to diminish the impact of the previously executed malicious command. This 
framework significantly enhances the cyber-physical security assessment capability of the operator 










ATTACK PROPAGATION IN CYBER-PHYSICAL ELECTRIC GRIDS 
 
 
Attacks such as bad data injection into electric grid measurements can cause disruptions 
that transcend the cyber realm and affect the physical world. This chapter introduces a graph-based 
attack propagation model that simulates a bad data injection attack and executes a heuristic defense 
strategy by using power system state estimation. The state estimator is used to identify maliciously 
injected data and adopt physical security metrics to determine attack mitigation actions. 
Visualization from the analysis performed by the simulation can guide the operator at the control 
center to take appropriate action to minimize disruption of the physical power system operation.  
4.1.   Existing Work  
Many studies have investigated the vulnerability of power grids by developing threat and 
attack models as well as by simulating different attack scenarios in a controlled environment. 
However, important challenges remain. One critical challenge is how to develop reasonable 
approaches and models that can mimic cyber-physical attacks in reality. Such models need to 
incorporate both a communications network and the power system’s layer. In the current literature, 
two of the major approaches for investigating the effects of cyber-physical attacks on power 
systems are bad data and bad command injection attacks [89].  In modeling the power system 
layer, researchers typically adopt  (one of) three popular model categories pure topological models 
[104], pure power flow models [105], and hybrid models [106]. Each category has its own 
advantages and disadvantages. Another challenge that researchers may face is that attackers might 
have different knowledge of the cyber-physical power grids, such as power system topological 
structures, electric features, real-time information, communication network parameters, 
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transmission and listening ports, and access points. With different levels of knowledge, attackers 
may adopt different attack strategies. 
Bad Data Injection (BDI) attacks have drawn wide attention in cyber-physical power grids 
and were first proposed by Liu and Ning [41]. Liu showed that attackers can manipulate field 
measurements and introduce bad data into certain state variables and bypass the existing 
techniques for bad measurement detection in power systems by exploiting their knowledge of the 
power system topology. Liu et al. proposed a bad data detection method based on adaptive 
partitioning state estimation. This estimation can raise the detection sensitivity by dividing the 
global power system into several subsystems. Bad data then can be located in a small area by 
multiple rounds of partitioning [107]. The authors in [52] analyze the cybersecurity of state 
estimators in SCADA systems operating in power grids by assuming that the attacker possesses 
only a perturbed model corresponding (only) to a partial model of the true system or even an 
outdated model. The attacker is then characterized by a set of objectives, and policies are proposed 
to synthesize stealthy deceptions attacks, both in the case of linear and nonlinear estimators. Real-
time online detection of stealthy false data injection attacks in power system state estimation was 
explored in [108], which proposed an online anomaly detection algorithm that utilizes load 
forecasts, generation schedules, and synchro-phasor data to detect measurement anomalies and 
provide some insight into the factors that affect the performance of the proposed algorithm. The 
research/authors also proposed an empirical method to obtain the minimum attack magnitudes and 
the detection thresholds for meeting specified false positive and true positive rates. The work in 
[108] was extended in [109] by Li et al., who considered the sequential (online) detection of false 
data injection attacks in the electric grid. The authors aimed to manipulate the state estimation 
procedure by injecting malicious data into the monitoring meters. When unknown parameters in 
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the system, namely the state vector, inject malicious data, the set of attacked meters poses a 
significant challenge for designing a robust, computationally efficient, high-performance detector. 
Li et al. developed a sequential detector based on the generalized likelihood ratio to address this 
challenge. 
To accurately understand the impact of bad data injection in cyber-physical power delivery 
systems, we need to go beyond just constructing undetectable bad data injection attacks and 
investigate the modeling and simulation of how these attacks may propagate through a cyber-
physical power system. The goal of the work in this chapter is not to design undetectable bad data 
injection attacks or to develop better bad data detection tests, but rather the goal is to study how 
bad data injection attacks propagate in the system before they are identified and contained or 
mitigated by the operator.  
 
4.2. Contribution 
Our attack propagation model uses contextual information about the attacks by training 
multiple Markov Chain models. This chapter develops a novel framework that leverages attack 
graph notation and Markovian processes to demonstrate the propagation of malicious measurement 
injections into the power grid network, injections that are intended to make the System Operator 




4.3.  Attack Graph Semantics 
We represent the attacker’s strategy in two phases. The first phase is the preparation phase 
when the attacker needs to gather information and prepare all the necessary tools to execute an 
attack. Nodes 1-5 capture the preparation phase, as shown in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22 - Attack Graph Capturing Attacker's Strategy 
The second phase is the execution phase when the attacker executes the attack and interacts with 
the defender. The success or failure of the attack propagating from the source to the operator at the 
control center is modeled by a Markov Chain, as shown in Figure 23, which encapsulates both the 
attacker’s strategy and the probabilities of success/failure of the attack propagating from one node 





Figure 23 - Markov Chain capturing attacker’s strategy for compromising the power system 
under attack assuming no defender 
 
Each node represents a malicious task an attacker wants to complete in order to successfully reach 
their goal. In Figure 22, we assume that the tasks are sequential, which means that only one task 
is being executed at any point in time. We also assume that the system has bad data detection 
capability from the state estimator. The bad data detection of the state estimator detects and tries 
to prevent an ongoing attack from becoming successful; however, bad data detection does not reset 
the attacker’s current progress. Therefore, successful detection of an attack at any node only pushes 
the attacker back to the immediately previous node. It is noteworthy to point out that the example 
scenario shown in Figure 22does not show the possibility that a successful detection by the 
defender may cause the attacker’s progress to be set back by more than one node. The Markov 
Chain does not restrict how the edges are connected, so the edges do not need to connect with 
adjacent nodes. Each edge (directed) represents the attacker’s attempt to complete the next task 




Figure 24 - Markov Chain capturing attacker’s strategy for compromising the power system 
under attack assuming a defender with no state estimation 
 
The values on the edges represent the probability that the attacker will successfully 
complete the next task. The probabilities used in Figure 23 - Figure 25 are informally assigned 
similarly to the assigning in [110]. The probability assigned to each edge only depends on each 
individual vulnerability, which is similar to many existing metrics, such as in the Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [111]. As expected, there is a linear relationship between 
how fast the attack propagates and the probabilities on the edges relating to the attack. If the 
probabilities on the edge relating to defense are high, the probability of an attack going forward to 
the next edge decreases. Table 1 shows the mapping of an attacker’s tasks to each node in Figure 
22 - Figure 25. Figure 22 is the attack graph representation of the Markov Chains shown in Figure 





Figure 25 - Markov Chain capturing an attacker’s strategy for compromising the power system 
under attack assuming a defender with state estimation 
Table 10 - Mapping of Attacker's Tasks to Each Node 
Node Number Description 
1 Start 
2 Grid Data Obtained 
3 Fake data Prepared 
4 Background Check passed 
5 IP Address Obtained 
6 Substation Breached 
7 RTU(s) Accessed 
8 Fake Data Injected 
9 Incorrect State  
10 Loss of Load 
 
4.4.   Bad Data Injection Attack Scenario   
We assume that the attacker has full knowledge of the power system topology and that in 
the planning state, it obtains IP addresses/TCP ports of the Monitoring System and the Remote 
Terminal Units (RTU) at the substations. The attacker breaks into the substation enclosure 
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containing the RTUs and communication radio, connects a malicious computing device to the 
RTU, and can access the RTUs. The attacker compromises the measurements polled by the 
Monitoring System by constructing packets containing fake field readings and then transmitting 
the readings to the Monitoring System, as shown in Figure 26  below.  
 
Figure 26 - Cyber-Physical System Bad Data Injection Attack Path 
 
We also assume that the attacker’s goal is to cause the System Operator to issue an incorrect 
command as a result of the fake data injection attack rather than to completely disable the RTUs.  
 
4.5.   Attack Propagation Model  
The attack propagation model is a combined Markovian process and system state estimator 
model. As shown in Figure 22, we study attack propagation from the substation to the operator by 
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using a Markovian process. For a set of simulation time steps 𝑡 ∈ [1, 𝑇] the final state is obtained 
as shown in Equation 1. The 𝑥 in Equation 1 is a vector representing the state of each node. 
Therefore, the 𝑥 in our simulation is a vector of 10 elements, which represent the ten nodes in our 
attack graph. Each element in 𝑥 is either “0” for uncompromised, or “1” for compromised. 𝑃 is a 
matrix that contains probability values, as shown in Figures 2-4. The row number in 𝑃 is the node 
number at the tail-end of the edge. The column number in P is the node number at the head-end of 
the edge. If there is no edge connecting two nodes, the corresponding value in the matrix is 0. An 
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The model incorporates both the Markov Chain that captures attack propagation and a state 
estimation with bad data detection capabilities. The bad data detection algorithm is implemented 
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at Node 9 of Figure 25. We investigate three cases – no defender, defender without state estimation, 
and defender with state estimation. In the attack graph shown in Figure 22, Nodes 1-5 represent 
the attacker’s preparation process, which is described in Table 10. Nodes 6-10 represent the tasks 
executed by the attacker on to the power grid. Without a defender, the Markov Chain 
representation of the attack graph is shown in Figure 23. There is no edge that shows an attacker’s 
attack is pushed back to the previous node. In Figure 24, the Markov Chain representation of the 
attack graph shows the existence of a defender, but one (a defender) without state estimation. Node 
8 represents an attacker injecting fake data from the RTU. Node 9 represents the Analysis Module 
and Monitoring System in Figure 26. Without state estimation, there is a 0.9 (90%) chance that the 
fake data injected into the measurements will cause the Analysis Module to reach an incorrect 
system state, and then the Monitoring System displays the incorrect system state to the system 
operator. Furthermore, there is a 0.05 (5%) chance that the attack may be identified by the system 
operator, in which case the attacker’s progress is pushed back to Node 8. Finally, there is also a 
0.05 (5%) chance that the attack stays in Node 8 because the fake data has not reached the Analysis 
Module at Node 9. The probabilities are chosen to reflect the attacker’s chances of successfully 
carrying out a bad data injection attack in the real world. Without a state estimator, the operator 
would have to rely on experience and intuition in order to analyze the massive amounts of data 
received at the control center, which means the chance of detecting bad data injection is low. In 
Figure 25, the Markov Chain representation of the attack graph assumes the existence of a defender 
with state estimation in Node 9. In this case, the state estimator can detect and eliminate the bad 
data, which enhances the detection capabilities of the power system. Therefore, the edge from 
Node 8 to Node 9 has the probability P. P is a variable probability of detection, which is calculated 
by the state estimator by using a/the Chi-square cumulative distribution function. The existence of 
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a state estimator provides a means to mitigate the attack by preventing the attack from propagating 
to the next node.  
For simplicity, we model the bad data injection attack propagation by using a two-bus 
system with a generator and load, as shown in Figure 27. The field measurements from each bus 
are polled by two separate RTUs. The attacker compromises RTU1 measurements before 
compromising RTU2 measurements. RTU2 also acts as a Master Terminal Unit (MTU). An MTU 
can be an RTU that accepts different inputs such as field measurements from several RTUs and 




Figure 27 - Two-Bus Case under Bad Data Injection Attack 
 
The monitoring system collates the measurements by concatenating the measurements into a 




                                   𝒛 = [𝒛𝑹𝑻𝑼𝟏; 𝒛𝑹𝑻𝑼𝟐]                                                      (2)  
𝒛 = 𝒉(𝒙) + 𝒆                                                                (3) 
𝒛 = 𝑯𝒙 + 𝒆                                                                   (4) 
?̂? = (𝑯𝑻𝑹−𝟏𝑯)−𝟏𝑯𝑻𝑹−𝟏𝒛                                         (5) 
𝒓 = 𝒛 − 𝑯𝒙                                                                   (6) 
||𝒓 = 𝒛 − 𝑯𝒙|| ≤ 𝝉                                                     (7) 
𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌 = 𝒛 + 𝒂                                                             (8) 
||𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌 − 𝑯?̂? || ≤ 𝝉                                                   (9) 
 
Using a standardized weighted least-squares state estimation model, Equation (3) shows how the 
various field measurements denoted by z are related to the state variables x (i.e., the voltages and 
phase angles) and the measurement error e. 𝒉(∙) is a non-linear vector function expression of the 
measurements in terms of the state variables. Equation (4) shows the linear relationship between z, 
and x under DC power flow model assumptions. Equation (5) denotes the state estimates, where z 
is the vector of measurements, H is the measurement Jacobian matrix, R is the error covariance 
matrix, x, x̂ are the vectors of state variables and state estimates respectively, and e is the vector 
measurement error. The state estimates are considered valid only if the measurement residuals r are 
less than a threshold (𝜏), as shown in equations (6) and (7). The threshold is set based on state 
estimation residual information obtained from historical data when the system was operating 
normally. The attacker compromises measurements in the measurement vector z by changing 
measurement values, as shown in Equation (8), thus corrupting existing legitimate measurements.  
For this simulation, the available measurements are taken to be  
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and the quantities being estimated are 𝒙 = [𝜃2, 𝑉1, 𝑉2].  𝑅𝑇𝑈1 measurements are relayed to 𝑅𝑇𝑈2 
, which collates those measurements with its own and sends the collated measurements over the 
backbone communication network to the monitoring center. A synthetic load profile with peak load 
at mid-day is adopted to drive the simulation. Equation (8) is adopted in the formulation for 
minimizing the weighted least squares state estimator objective function shown in Equation (10), 
where 𝒉𝒊(𝒙) are components of the measurement Jacobian and Rii is the diagonal matrix elements 
representing the standard deviation of each measurement i.  







= [𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌 − 𝒉(𝒙)]
𝑇𝑹−𝟏[𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌 − 𝒉(𝒙)]               (10) 
 





= [𝑯(𝒙)]𝑇𝑹−𝟏[𝒛𝒂𝒕𝒕𝒂𝒄𝒌 − 𝒉(𝒙)]       (11)   
where 𝑯(𝒙) = [
𝜕ℎ𝑖(𝒙)
𝜕𝑥𝑗
] is the measurement Jacobian. Expanding the nonlinear function 𝑔(𝑥) 
around a guess state vector 𝒙𝑘and dropping the higher order of terms leads to a Newton iterative 
solution: 
            𝒙𝑘+1 = 𝒙𝑘 − [𝑮(𝒙𝑘)]−1𝒈(𝒙𝑘)                     (12) 
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It is imperative to note that the estimated state of the system would be the compromised states that 
do not reflect the true state of the system because of the field measurements being compromised.  
 
4.6. Simulation Results  
As described in the previous sections, the attacker’s strategy to compromise the power grid is 
broken down into multiple tasks that the attacker must complete in order to reach a certain outcome. 
In the example attack graph shown in Figure 22, the attacker’s goal is to inject bad data into the 
power grid to fool the system operator into issuing an incorrect command, which can damage the 
power grid itself. The attacker manipulates field measurements to be telemetered from both RTUs 
to the Analysis module for the execution of important grid functions such as state estimation, as 
illustrated in Figure 27. To detect bad data, we use the Chi-squared distribution to identify the 
presence of bad data, followed by the largest normalized residual test that identifies the actual 
measurements to be removed. When the residual is higher than normal, the operator at the 
monitoring center is notified.  
By using the Markov Chain equation (1), we are able to find the probability of bad data because 
an attack is present at a given node for a specific time step. We present three simulation scenarios: 





Figure 28 - Probability of an attack being located at each node with respect to time for the case 
assuming no defender 
 
Figure 29 - Probability of an attack being located at each node with respect to time for the case 





Figure 30 - Probability of an attack being located at each node with respect to time for the case 
assuming a defender exists and using state estimation. 
 
All the simulation cases have the attacker starting their attack at a time equal to 2 seconds. 
In Figure 28, the simulation shows that the attack quickly propagates through Nodes 1-10, and so 
the probability of the attack being in Node 10 is 1 after only a few seconds. In this case, the attack 
propagates all the way through with the operator being presented with the incorrect state of the 
system, thus causing the operator to take incorrect action. In Figure 29, the simulation shows that 
the attack takes longer to reach Node 10, and after the simulation ends, the probability of an attack 
reaching Node 10 is less than 1. This means that with consideration of a defender in the power grid, 
the attacker does not always reach the goal with certainty. In Figure 30, the simulation shows that 
the attack still propagates through Nodes 1-5, but because of an increase in detection capability, the 
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probability that the attacker’s attack stays at Nodes 7-8 is very high. In this case, the state estimation 
provides a viable means of increasing the defender’s capabilities through the bad data detection 
functionality of the system state estimator. As a result, it is highly unlikely that the bad data 
propagates all the way to the control center, which could force the operator to decide based on 
inaccurate data. 
 
4.7.   Conclusion  
The novel contribution of this research is the use of an attack graph to model attack 
propagation in a power grid scenario that combines the use of state estimation. Currently, the attack 
graph models only sequential tasks but does not model the parallel execution of an attacker’s set of 
tasks. In addition, the attack graph does not consider either the attacker’s ability to learn or the 
defender’s ability to take away the knowledge gained by the attacker. The combination of the attack 
propagation model and state estimation provides additional information for the system operator so 
that appropriate mitigation strategies can be implemented. For example, if the simulation result 
shows that there is a high chance of an RTU being attacked, then the system operator may take 
actions such as password reset, disconnect the access point of an RTU, or increase the priority to 
send out substation crews to check on the compromised RTU. Results and insights from this work 
can inform the designing of better incidence response plans for operators at the control center. 
Operators can use the information provided from the visualization of the attack propagation and 
abnormal residuals to filter through information and pinpoint the most vulnerable sectors of the 
cyber-physical power system under attack and thus trip the necessary alarms and/or issue the 






MODULAR DESIGN OF CPSA CO-SIMULATOR 
 
This chapter discusses the modular design of the cyber-physical security assessment (CPSA) 
co-simulator. As shown in Figure 31, the design consists of various sub-modules interacting 
dynamically to model, capture, and analyze bulk electric systems containing multiple substations. 
The connected port of each substation as well as at the control center mirrors an Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) for deep inspection of the packets flowing in the communication network. Below 
are the sub-modules of the CPSA tool: 
 
 




5.1. Data Management Module 
The data management module stores all the measurement values, legitimate as well as rogue 
values, received in text files (extracted from the DNP3 packets). It stores rogue values with a flag 
“up" to distinguish them from legitimate data values. This module extracts measurement values 
from each packet or file and passes them to the next module, known as the logic module. The data 
management module uses buffer storage available at the control center for storing the packets.  
 
5.2. Setup Module  
The setup module specifies the user-defined rules, such as acceptable operational limits. It also 
provides a component-criticality metric, which clearly defines different components of the cyber-
physical system by their severe criticality of loss. 
 
5.3. Logic Module 
The logic module verifies the boundary limits of each measurement value. If the module 
identifies bad measurement values, it separates out those values by setting the flag “up" for them 
but still passes the bad values in order to assess their effect on the power system under the bad 
measurement injection attack scenario to verify how much these values would impact the current 
state of the system (if they went undetected). 
 
5.4. Cyber-Physical System Input Module 
This module is comprised of the enterprise communication network model as well as the EMS 
power system model for the existing cyber-physical electricity system. The module implements 
the following models: 
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A. Enterprise Communication Network Model:  
It provides input to the co-simulator regarding various communication components, 
including the communication network topology, the number of connected devices in the 
network, the baud rate, the packet size, the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size, and 
the propagation delay over the communication channel. 
 
B. EMS Power System Model: 
It provides the co-simulator with power system input, which includes the power system 
topology, different parameters (with the actual value as well as acceptance ranges) for 
components such as transmission lines, buses, generators, loads, shunts, and transformers, 
and the configuration of the power system at the time of data acquisition.  
 
5.5. Cyber-Physical System Application Module 
 This module is the main functional and application-driven module. It runs every few (4-5) 
minutes to check the current status of the system as it completes one cycle of 8-time steps in this 
duration. It performs all cyber-physical operations of the CPSA co-simulator and constitutes the 




Figure 32 - Main Graphic User Interface of CPSA Co-Simulator 
 
Based on the analysis and observations of this module, instructions for appropriate actions are 
forwarded to the security assessment module, which calculates the overall cyber-physical security 
metric for the system. This module performs the following sub-modular tasks: 
 
A. Communication-Aware Management Module: It is responsible for managing different 
components of the communication system along with the statistics of any cyber-attack 
impact. Normal operations performed by this module include frequent pings to different 
communication devices to verify whether they are active and up and maintaining log 
records of the communications at the control center, RTUs, and intermediate devices, such 
as routers. This module consists of sub-modules described in more details thus: 
 
I. Communications between Different Components: The co-simulation is made real-time 
by communication between the control center and RTUs through the provided routers, 
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where the sender can send multiple messages with a specified MTU size at one time, and 
the receiver responds with an acknowledgment for each message along with the action that 
needs to be performed, as shown in Figure 33. The communication system also includes a 
propagation delay and the delay at components for computations. 
 
 
Figure 33 - A polling request initialed by the CC and RTUs reply with the current 
measurement values. 
 
II. Log Records of Communication Components: The communication system maintains log 
records at the control center, at all RTUs, and at the routers. The logs include messages 
sent and received by the control center and RTUs, the enqueue and dequeue timing of each 
packet at each router along with sender and receiver information, and the route traversed 





Figure 34 - Maintaining log records of the communication network statistics. 
 
 
III. Evaluate System Behavior under different Cyber-Attacks Scenarios: The 
communication system is simulated in the presence of different cyber-attack scenarios so 
that the overall impact and the behavior of the cyber-physical system can be observed. The 
attack modeler, as shown in Figure 35. is used to simulate a bad command injection attack. 
A bad data injection attack affects the communication system components and results in 





Figure 35 - Attack Modeler of CPSA Co-Simulator 
 
IV. Evaluate System Behavior with Future Demands Scenarios: Based on future forecasts, 
such as the predicted load profile and generation dispatch (for example, the next 30 
minutes), future states of the cyber-physical system are observable. This enables the co-
simulator to run and evaluate system states faster than in real-time. After each co-simulator 
run of 2 minutes for 30 iterations, the system states for the next 30 minutes can be 
accurately predicted and analyzed.  
 
B. Power-Aware Management Module: This module analyzes the current state of the power 
system by comparing legitimate and malicious or suspicious measurement values to evaluate 
their impact on the overall CPS security. It then simulates the what-if scenarios by using 
contingency analysis. It also verifies whether the suspicious measurements should be 
93 
 
forwarded to other applications if the system is still secure. This module contains enhanced 
versions of three core power system functions typically performed by the EMS: global state 
estimation, power flow, and contingency analysis. 
 
5.6. Security Assessment Module 
This module is specifically designed for operators to analyze the CPS system behavior based 
on a variety of observations provided by other modules. This module evaluates a trust metric to 
figure out the critical components of the cyber-physical system and performs a log-based analysis 
to verify secure operation. It can investigate any unexpected behavior it finds in any 
communication or power system component. Finally, the operator concludes with decision-based 
analysis and takes suitable actions in order to maintain the secure and stable operation of the power 
system. 
 
5.7. Contribution and Conclusion 
This chapter described the modular design of the co-simulator, which serves as the core for the 
software implementation presented in the next chapter. The following is an outline of the 
contributions of this chapter: 
1. Modelled and implemented a worst-case contingency analysis that captures the cyber-
physical security of a test bulk electric system. 
2. Designed and implemented a heuristic for decision making for a test bulk electric system 
under a cyber-physical attack. 
3. Implemented a heuristic for log-based analysis of bulk electric systems under a cyber-









This chapter discusses the development of the software framework for the integrated time-
driven, event-oriented, cyber-physical security co-simulator designed and implemented in this 
dissertation. In particular, it describes a co-simulation infrastructure that is required for the 
implementation of the cyber-physical security assessment application framework development. 
The software framework describes the software libraries developed or extended, while the 
application framework describes the different application modules implemented in the co-
simulator to address the following requirements: (1) How to determine the physical impact of 
various types of cyber-attack on the operation of the grid, (2) How to quantify the cyber-physical 
security of a system in real-time, (3) How to increase operator situational awareness of system-
level cyber-physical security through cyber-physical metrics and visualization.  
 
6.1. Cyber-Physical System Co-Simulation Paradigms  
The area of electric grid cyber-physical security co-simulation and testbeds have not been 
fully explored. In this direction, Davis et al. [112] presented a survey of cyber ranges and 
categorized these ranges as  
1. Modeling and simulation, where models of each component exist 
2. Ad-hoc or overlay, where tests are run on production network hardware with some level of 
test isolation provided by a software overlay, and  
3. Emulation, which maps a desired experimental network topology and software 




6.2. CPSA Co-Simulation Software Framework Implementation  
To realize the capability to simulate power and cyber elements, we combined and extended 
multiple existing software modules in a co-simulation environment that enables the tracking of the 
execution sequence of each module. This co-simulation framework implements the necessary 
interfaces and achieves reasonable computational performance. The co-simulation framework is 
based on the combination of a GridSim smart grid simulator for modeling the communications 
network, event scheduler, model validation module, data management module, and I/O module. 
The power system is modeled in PowerWorld.  The computation module is housed in MATLAB,  
where the cyber-physical application framework is implemented. The application framework runs 
algorithms such as state estimation, contingency analysis, etc. GridSim and MATLAB interact 
using TCP/IP sockets, with GridSim being the server and via a proxy server MatlabControl.java 
with MATLAB being the client. The proxy server handles all request and message transfers between 
GridSim and MATLAB. The TCP/IP connection enables running all software on a single computer 
or using a remote computer to run MATLAB and PowerWorld. The Instrument Control Toolbox 
is required for MATLAB to support TCP communication; however, any other toolbox enabling 
TCP connections could also be used. 
 On the other end of the co-simulation, MATLAB and PowerWorld are connected and 
interact through a Simulator Automation Server (SimAuto) that coordinates data exchanges and 
message transfers between instantiated COM objects. The interface between Matlab and 
PowerWorld/SimAuto described here is modified so that it can act as a gateway for requests issued 
by JADE agents. The MATLAB interface allows for the integration and interaction of the different 





Figure 36 - Co-simulation Software Implementation Framework with Interfaces designed 
between GridSim (JADE), MATLAB and PowerWorld 
Below is a brief description of the different platforms used in the development of the co-simulator.  
A. GridSim: The GridSim toolkit allows modeling and simulation of entities in both parallel and 
distributed computing systems. It provides an environment for creating different classes of 
heterogeneous resources for solving computing and data-intensive applications. The 
processing nodes within a resource can be heterogeneous in terms of processing capability,              
configuration, and availability. 
B. MATLAB/Matlabcontrol: Matlabcontrol is a Java API that makes it possible to call 
MATLAB from Java. It provides the ability to evaluate a variable (eval) and a function (feval) 
and allow get and set variables from Java to MATLAB. 
C. JADE: JADE is used to provide an interface between the communication network (in Java) 
and the power system (in PowerWorld) through an interface by using MATLAB. JADE is an 
open-source middleware and a Java-based framework that facilitates the creation of agent-
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based simulations by providing basic functionalities, such as agent and easily extended 
behavior classes. Although many other multi-agent frameworks are available, JADE is the 
most commonly used for power system applications.  
D. PowerWorld: PowerWorld is a power systems simulator for simulating high voltage power 
systems. This tool allows/makes possible power flow analysis on a system with up to 100,000 
buses. Multiple add-ons allow the performing of additional analysis such as transient stability, 
optimal power flow, voltage stability, reserves, transfer capacity, etc. SimAuto, which is an 
add-on used to control the simulator from external applications, acts as a COM object with 
which other software can communicate by sending requests and receiving data. 
 
6.3. GridSim System Architecture  
A multi-layer architecture and abstraction for the development of the GridSim platform and 
its applications are shown in Figure 37. The first layer of GridSim is concerned with the scalable 
Java interface and the runtime machinery - JVM (Java Virtual Machine). The JVM has been 
modified and extended for multiprocessor systems where each RTU and the control center that 
have been defined in the system run dedicated individual processors with assigned grid resources 
(instantiated in the third module). The second layer is a discrete-event infrastructure 
implementation built with the SimJava interface provided by the first layer. The third layer models 
and simulates core Grid entities such as resources, information services, uniform access interface, 
and primitive application modeling and framework for creating higher-level entities. We extended 
the GridSim toolkit [113] to focus on system entities modeled as RTUs, which use the discrete-
event services offered by the lower-level infrastructure to respond to polls for data initiated by the 
control center. The last layer implements application and resource modeling with different 
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scenarios by using the services provided by the two lower-level modules in order to evaluate 
scheduling and resource management policies and algorithms. It is possible for the test case to 
become corrupted from previous co-simulation runs during the input/output (I/O) read, write, or 
initialization process. Hence, a model validation layer has been built into the application module. 
At the start of every co-simulation process, this module validates the power system model 
parameter against the original test case parameters stored in a local database. This is to ensure that 
the co-simulation is run on the test case with the correct parameters.  
 
Figure 37 – An extended modular architecture for GridSim platform and components 
Designing and implementing the communication network and the co-simulation driver required 
creating and/or extending GridSim entities as time-shared systems. Descriptions of these entities 




6.4. SimJava Discrete Event Model  
The GridSim discrete event simulation is handled by SimJava, while a general-purpose 
discrete event simulation package is implemented in Java. The simulations in SimJava contain a 
number of entities modeled as RTUs and a Control Center.  All entities were implemented to run 
in different parallel threads. We encode each RTU’s behavior in Java by using its body( ) method, 
which requires implementing the following core primitives which were adapted from [113] and 
extended in this work: 
• sim schedule() This method sends event objects to other entities via ports. It encapsulates 
commands issued from the control center and sends the commands to the RTU the 
command was intended for.  
• sim hold() This executes holds for a specified simulation time and is implemented by all 
RTU’s, leaving enough time for all polled data from the RTUs to be collated by the control 
center before the next stage of the simulation is initiated.  
• sim wait() This allows either the RTU or control center to await an event object’s arrival. 
The control center implements this method when waiting to receive all polled data from 
the RTUs in the field.  
These methods and attributes facilitate a network of active entities that communicate by sending 
and receiving passive event objects efficiently. Because logging the arrival, departure, and 
execution of all commands and instructions is crucial in the co-simulation, a central object 
Sim_system creates a timestamped ordered queue of every event. The list of events is created from 
the user-specified scenario at the beginning of each simulation, at which time all entities are created 
and their body() methods are executed. Whenever any entity executes a simulation function, the 
Sim_system object halts that entity’s thread and places an event on the future queue to indicate 
100 
 
execution of the function. When all entities have halted, Sim_system removes the next event off 
the queue, advances the simulation time accordingly, and restarts entities as appropriate. This 
process is dynamically repeated until no more events are generated. 
 
6.4.1. GridSim Entities 
 
The RTUs were designed with the capability for simulation as a single processor machine 
with heterogeneous resources that can be configured as time-shared systems. During the 
simulation, GridSim creates the specified number of multi-threaded RTUs and abstracts all the 
entities (control center and RTUs) and their time-dependent interactions in the real system. It 
supports the creation of user-defined time-dependent response functions for all interacting entities. 
The response function is both a function of the past and current states of the entities. The GridSim 
simulation contains entities for the control center application, RTU application, users, brokers, 
resources, statistics, and network-based I/O, as shown in the flow diagram in Figure 39. These 
entities were adapted from [113] and extended in this research work: 
 
User. Each instance of the User entity represents a Grid user. A User entity is implemented as a 
Control Center or an RTU. The User entity creates a simulation instance or an experiment that 
contains an application description, which is a list of simulation actions to be processed. A network 
of active entities -  RTUs and the CC - are instantiated and communicate by sending and receiving 
passive event objects efficiently. The control center User instance differs from the RTU instance 
with respect to the following characteristics: 
Polling: Only the control center can execute polling commands. 
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Scheduling Optimization Strategy: Both the Control Center and the RTU User instances 
implement a time minimization strategy by immediately sending requested data once they received 
the request.  
 
Broker. A Broker entity implements the round-robin algorithm and is responsible for scheduling 
tasks. At the start of every simulation, each user is dynamically bound to an instance of the Broker 
entity. Tasks initiated by a User are submitted to its associated broker, which then schedules the 
tasks according to the User’s scheduling policy. The broker, using a get method, acquires a list of 
available resources from the global directory entity before scheduling the tasks. The broker then 
coordinates the execution of the tasks between the Control Center and the RTUs.  
 
Resource. The Resource entity represents a Grid resource. Resources instantiated during the 
simulation differ from each other in the following aspects: 
• number of processors 
• speed of processing 
• internal process scheduling policy – time shared or space-shared 
The resource speed and the job execution time are defined in terms of the Millions of Instructions 
per Second (MIPS).  
 
Grid information service. This provides information about the simulation setup, such as the 
number of RTUs and communication routers defined for a particular simulation run. It also 
performs resource registration services and keeps a record of resources available in the Grid. The 
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instantiated brokers can request configuration and status information from the Grid Information 
Service entity.  
 
 Input and output. Input and Output entities facilitate the flow of data between the Control Center 
and the RTUs. All GridSim entities instantiated during the simulation have assigned I/O ports for 
establishing links between other entities and their own Input and Output entities. The entity 
communication model via Input and Output entities in GridSim is depicted in Figure 38. 
Implementing separate threads for both the Input and Output entities allows for full-duplex 
message passing communications among different entities.  
 
 






Figure 39 - A flow diagram in GridSim-based simulations 
 
6.5. Control Center and RTU Application Model  
No specific application model is defined in the GridSim toolkit; therefore, we developed an 
application model to meet the requirements of the CPSA co-simulator. The application model 
sends the execution signal to the CPSA module to initiate cyber-physical security evaluation, 
which involves performing observability analysis, state estimation, contingency analysis, and 
security metric computation functions. Each task instantiated in the Application Model has its 
characteristics and requirements defined through Gridlet objects. A Gridlet is a package that 
contains all the information associated with a task and its execution details, such as the job length 
expressed in MIPS, the disk I/O operations, the size of input and output files, and the task 
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originator. These parameters determine both the execution time and the time required to transport 
the input and output files between the control center and the RTUs. 
 
6.6. Communication Protocol Model  
Events trigger the interaction among GridSim entities. Events fall into two broad categories: 
service request and service delivery. Events can be implemented as either internal or external and 
as synchronous or asynchronous. Events originating from the same entity are called internal events, 
and those originating from the external entities are called external events. Synchronous events are 
ones when the event source entity waits until the event destination entity is finished performing all 
the tasks associated with the event. The control center polling the RTUs is implemented as a 
synchronous event. Asynchronous events are those in which the source entity initiates an event 
and continues with other activities without waiting for the completion of the initial event. In a 
typical CPSA co-simulation, the complete set of entities and the use of events for simulating the 
interaction between the entities are shown in Figure 40. Figure 40 depicts the interaction between 
a resource entity that simulates time-shared scheduling and other entities. The GridSim entities 
such as the control center and RTU users, resource broker, information service, statistics, 
shutdown, and report writer send events to other entities to signify the request for service, to deliver 





Figure 40 - An event diagram for the interaction between a time-shared resource and other 
entities  
6.6.1. Scheduling of Time-Shared Resources  
 
Time-sharing instead of space-sharing of resources, was implemented in the GridSim 
simulator. The resource simulator uses internal events to simulate the execution of Gridlet tasks, 
which are initiated by the control center when the control center polls the RTUs for data. At the 
beginning of the simulation, 24 tasks/jobs are transmitted to the RTUs for a 24-substation power 
system where each substation has a dedicated RTU. When jobs arrive, time-shared systems start 
their execution immediately and share resources among all the jobs. Time-sharing is executed 
through a round-robin algorithm. Whenever a new Gridlet task arrives, the processing time of the 
existing Gridlets is updated, and then the newly arrived job is added to the execution set. Figure 7 
shows the algorithm for simulating the time-shared scheduling and execution. The algorithm is 
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adapted from [113] and extended in this research work:
 
Figure 41 - An event handler algorithm for scheduling time-shared resources 
 
6.7. GridSim Java Package Design  
A unified modeling language (UML) diagram of the modified GridSim package class diagram 
hierarchy is presented in Figure 42. The specification of each class contains up to three parts: 
attributes, methods, abstract and internal classes. The GridSim package implements the following 




Figure 42 - Class Diagram of GridSim Package using UML Notation [113] 
108 
 
class gridsim.GridSim: This class is extended by all GridSim entities. It is the main class of the 
GridSim package and inherits event management and threaded entity features from the 
eduni.simjava.Sim entity class. The GridSim class provides networking and event delivery 
features, which allow synchronous communication for service access or delivery. A networked 
GridSim entity gains communication capability via the objects of GridSim’s I/O entity classes, 
gridsim.Input and gridsim.Output classes. The GridSim class supports methods for simulation 
initialization, management, and flow control.  
 
class gridsim.Input: This class was implemented to extend the eduni.simjava.Sim entity class 
and instantiates a port through which a simulation entity receives data. It maintains an event queue 
to serialize the data-in-flow and delivers the data to its parent entity. Inputs include communication 
parameters such as the baud rate, propagation delay, number of packets, and packet size. Power 
system input parameters include Bus, Branch, Generator, Load, and Shunt parameters. Input 
parameters are first sanitized to remove any errors during the input process and then held by an 
array list data structure from which they are sent to the power system and communication network 
configurators that then use the information to configure and set up the different systems to be 
simulated. 
 
class gridsim.Output: Similar to the gridsim.Input class, the class gridsim.Output instantiates 
a port through which a simulation entity sends data to the simulated network. It maintains an event 




class gridsim.Machine: This class defines a uniprocessor or shared memory multiprocessor 
machine. In this class, all RTUs and the control center are modeled as machines.  
 
class gridsim.MachineList: An instance of this class simulates a collection of RTU machines. A 
star topology is used to connect all the RTUs to the control center in a Wide Area Network (WAN) 
architecture.  
 
class gridsim.GridResource: This class extends the GridSim class and inherits the 
communication and concurrent entity capability of the GridSim class. An instance of this class 
simulates a resource with properties defined in an object of the gridsim.ResourceCharacteristics 
class.  
 
class gridsim.Gridlet: This class represents a job package that contains job length, the length of 
input and output data in bytes, execution start and end time, and the originator of the job.  
 
class gridsim.GridletList: This class is used to maintain a list of Gridlets and support methods 
for organizing them. 
 
6.8. Designing CPSA Interface(s) Connections 
This section describes the design of special interfaces and Application Programming 




6.9. Designing the MATLAB-PowerWorld Connection Interface: 
 
This interface is established with the use of the COM server offered by SimAuto. Through 
this interface, PowerWorld can be requested to run instructions such as the following: 
1. Open, save, and close a case (network). 
2. List the devices of each type (buses, branches, generators, loads, etc.) present in the case. 
3. Get the parameters (status, MW and MVAR rating, nominal voltage, etc.) of different elements 
or all elements of a given type. 
4. Change the parameters of an element or all elements of a given type. 
5. Run a power flow using the Newtown-Raphson method. 
Once a connection between MATLAB and PowerWorld is established, functions running the 
above-mentioned instructions can be used in MATLAB to interact with PowerWorld and return 
results. 
 
6.9.1. Designing the JADE-PowerWorld Interface 
 
JADE cannot directly interface with PowerWorld. It must connect through MATLAB. 
There is no Java documentation available to directly connect Java with PowerWorld as a COM 
object. To enable a connection between JADE and MATLAB, we use a Transmission Protocol 
Connection (TPC), which allows us to run both MATLAB and PowerWorld on a single computer 
or using a remote computer for running MATLAB and PowerWorld. This connection procedure 
was adapted from [114] and extended in this research work. The connection between MATLAB 
and PowerWorld is established with a COM object through SimAuto. A single agent in JADE 
handles all communications with MATLAB using InterfaceAgent. On initialization, a TCP 
connection is established between InterfaceAgent and MATLAB and is then open throughout the 
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entire simulation. The JADE agent sends a message with the desired action information to 
InterfaceAgent using the standard Message Transport Protocol (MTP). InterfaceAgent processes 
the content of the message and sends it to MATLAB through TCP. MATLAB receives the 
message, processes the respective parameters, and requests PowerWorld to run the appropriate 
instructions. After executing the instructions, PowerWorld returns the result to MATLAB through 
the COM interface. MATLAB then reprocesses the answer and sends it through TCP back to 
InterfaceAgent. Finally, InterfaceAgent processes the result it received and sends the final response 
to the agent that issued the initial request. 
The run times indicated in Figure 43 show that these interfaces perform well to get (obtain) the 
parameters of the buses and run a power flow on a 42-bus test system. Note that run times may 
vary for other systems and other runs. 
 




6.10. Contribution and Conclusion  
This chapter presented the software implementation framework of the co-simulator tool 
developed for assessing bulk electric system cyber-physical security. One contribution of 
Chapter Six is an explanation and presentation of: 
1. The design and implementation of a novel GridSim-MATLAB interface, which acts a gateway 
for message passing communications between the two platforms. 
2. The design and implementation of a novel MATLAB-PowerWorld interface for executing real-
time scripting instructions in PowerWorld through the PowerWorld automation server. 
3. The design and implementation of a modular architecture for simulating the communication 
network of the test cyber-physical systems by using GridSim. 
4. The implementation of a cyber-physical security assessment module which efficiently and 
robustly characterizes and quantifies the cyber-physical security of the system under normal 





CYBER-PHYSICAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 
The cyber-physical security assessment (CPSA) co-simulator tool developed in this 
dissertation accesses the cyber-physical security of an entire cyber-physical bulk electric system. 
Also, it allows management of the communication network (by controlling the baud rate, 
propagation delay, and Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU)) and the substations topology (the 
connection of nodes and routers).  
 
7.1. Bad Command Injection Attack Impact Evaluation  
One way that we can observe the cyber-physical impact of a bad command injection attack on 
the power system is by using different setting preferences in the Wide Area Communication 
Network (WACN). The adversary can either send a malicious command to the substation’s RTU 
or alter a legitimate command that was sent by the control center over an insecure network. To test 
the co-simulator tool presented in Chapter Six, we used it to perform a cyber-physical security 
assessment on two different 24-substation power system with 42 buses, 62 lines, 8 generators, 27 
loads, 6 transformers, and 9 shunt capacitor banks. The tool first simulates the normal operation 
case before simulating the bad command injection attack scenario. When simulating normal 
operation, CPSA is initialized with the main interface, as shown in Figure 45, where the operator 
sets communication parameters such as the baud rate, propagation delay, number of packets to be 
sent, and packet size window at the Control Center (CC)and the RTU. We simulated a normal case 
to provide the operator with a baseline case with which to compare the bad command attack 
scenario against. Deviations from normal operational trends help the operator identify when the 
system is under attack. The main interface provides the operator with the evolution of the insecurity 
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of the system over time. The polling requests (a read command) from the CC to different 
substations’ RTUs are initiated every 5 seconds. Upon receiving a request, each RTU 
acknowledges the request and starts the process of collecting field measurements. Then each RTU 
prepares to send the measurement value packets over the wide-area network. Similarly, once the 
CC receives these packets from the RTU, the CC sends an acknowledgment to each respective 
RTU. The sent power system measurements include active and reactive line power (LineMW, 
LineMVR), bus voltage and angle (BusPUVolt, BusRad), generator active and reactive power 
(GenMW, GenMVR) and voltage (GenVolt), load active and reactive power (LoadMW, 
LoadMVR), and transformer tap ratio (LineTap). After receiving the measurements, the operator 
performs control actions to balance the demand-supply of power. These actions include changing 
the status (open/close) of circuit breakers connected to various power system components, such as 
transmission lines (LineStatus), generators (GenStatus), loads (LoadStatus), transformers 
(modeled as LineStatus), and shunt capacitors (SSStatus) 
 
7.1.1. Test Case A 
 
Test Case A simulates a bad command injection attack on the cyber-physical bulk electric 
system as shown in Figure 44.  
 
Pre-conditions: Using load forecast information derived from historical data, we simulate the 
expected normal operational behavior of the power system (under no attack) for eight iterations, 
as shown in Figure 45. The result of this simulation is stored in comma-separated files and is 
adopted as the baseline case. The simulation lasts for eight minutes with 8 time steps, each of 
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which represents a one-minute interval. Next, the bad command injection attack is simulated. An 
attack can target at any time step. 
 
Main Process: We use the co-simulator to assess the effect of a bad control command over the 
communication network. Below are the execution steps of the co-simulation: 
1) The co-simulator models a communication scenario, which maps the real communication 
network parameters. These parameters are set as follows: the baud rate = 1572864 bits/sec, the 
propagation delay = 300 ms, command = “CC → RTU: Send Measurement Values-,” the packet 
buffer size at the CC = 180 bytes, and the packet buffer size at the RTU = 1500 bytes. 
2) We model and perform a single attack as a malicious command injection operation, and the 
command type “Change Line Status” is set from “close” to “open,” and the command is transmitted 
to the RTU that changes the status of the transmission line from bus 32 to bus 37 from “closed” to 
“open” via the attack modeler in Figure 46  
3) The IDS suspects the command is not a “legitimate command” based on its rules filtration and 
pattern matching. The IDS then notifies the operator about a malicious command based on its rule 
formation and command pattern matching. Figure 47 shows an “ALERT” dialog box that indicates 
that the IDS suspects the command to be malicious. The operator can view the JSON (JavaScript 
Object Notation) file and its parameters. The role of the IDS is critical here because it notifies the 
operator about a cyber incident, which is not a normal power routine operation. 
4) The operator at the CC views the command log information and finds that the command was 
not initiated by himself/herself. The operator then decides to simulate the command and observe 
its effect on the power system with the option to allow the command to be executed in the actual 




Result: For normal operation, the aggregate megawatt contingency overload (AMWCO) value, 
which measures the system insecurity, is observed to be 200 MWCO, which is normal and acts as 
the baseline case. When the simulation is started, a malicious command is suspected by the IDS at 
time step 5. This is because, under the bad command injection case, the adversary injected a 
malicious command into the system at timestep 5. The IDS sends an alert message through the 
IDS notification interface. This alert message prompts the operator for the next action to either 
simulate or reject the command, as shown in Figure 47 and Figure 48. If the operator decides to 
simulate the effect of the malicious command,  this generates an attack output file and finally 
allows the execution of the command on the real power system with the effect observed in Figure 
49 and Figure 50.  
 
Post-conditions: Once a malicious command is successfully injected and simulated,  the power 
system cyber-physical security is evaluated. Then, the results of the simulation of the bad 
command injection attack scenario are compared with the baseline case to characterize the 
system’s deviations from the normal operations. An attack is identified if the real results differ 
significantly from the projected results. Figure 45 shows the evolution of the cyber-physical 
security of the system under the normal case plotted from time step 1 to 8 versus the total system 
load and the AMWCO. Figure 49 shows the system AMWCO when the bad command “Open line 
32-37” is simulated in the power system at time step 5. At that iteration, the AMWCO suddenly 
increases and remains high for the remainder of the simulation. The effect of the attack can be 
observed at the attack trigger time of 5, as shown in Figure 49, which shows that the security of 
the system as measured in this test by the AMWCO increase by 50% from 200 MWCO under the 
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normal operation case to 300 MWCO as a result of the bad command injection that caused 
overloading of transmission lines around the 32-37 line connection. Figure 50 shows the 
visualization of the system under attack with the transmission line MW meter reading in red, 
indicating that the transmission line was overloaded. In this malicious command scenario, the 
components in the system under attack are highlighted for the operator through the use of a 
blinking alarm that is triggered when said components are maliciously tampered with. In this case, 
lines 32-37  blink. The communication lines used to access the breakers tied to lines 32-37 also 
trigger an alarm and blink. This feature of our visualization module allows the operator to react 
quickly to the portion of the system under attack and take remedial actions to mitigate the effects 
of the attack, in this case by reclosing lines 32-37.  
 





Figure 45 - CPSA main interface showing normal operation 
 





Figure 47 - IDS Alert of a Bad Command with the Option to Simulate 
 
 








Figure 50 - CPSA visualization capturing lines 32-37 under attack and the communication 
channels used to access the breakers connected to transmission lines 32-37. 
 
7.1.2. Test Case B   
This section describes designing, implementing, and co-simulating a bad command 
injection attack in CPSA on a different 24-substation cyber-physical bulk electric system. The 
process for simulating the cyber-physical security assessment for this case is the same as that for 
test case A, but it results in different system post-conditions. 
 
Post-conditions: A malicious command is successfully injected and simulated, and the system's 
cyber-physical security is evaluated. The results of the simulations of the bad command injection 
attack scenarios are compared with the results (those) of the baseline case to 
121 
 
characterize/determine the extent to which (how much) the system deviated from normal 
operations. An attack is identified if the real results differ significantly from the projected results. 
Figure 53shows the evolution of the cyber-physical security of the system under the normal case 
plotted against the total system load and also plotted against the AMWCO. Figure 56 shows the 
system AMWCO when the bad command “Open lines 32-37” is simulated in the power system at 
time step 5. The AMWCO suddenly increases at that iteration and remains high for the remainder 
of the simulation. This sudden increase demonstrates that the effect of the attack can be observed 
at the attack trigger time of 5. The security of the system as measured by the AMWCO increased 
by 37.5% from 8,000 MWCO under the normal operation case to 11,000 MWCO as a result of the 
bad command injection, which caused an overloading of transmission lines around the line 32-37 
connection. Figure 52 shows the visualization of the system under attack with transmission line 
MW meter reading in red, indicating that the transmission line was overloaded. The components 
in the system under attack are highlighted for the operator through a blinking alarm that is triggered 
when said components are maliciously tampered with. In this case, line 32-37  blinked. The 
communication lines used to access the breakers tied to line 32-37 also triggered an alarm and 
blinked. This feature of our visualization module allows the operator to react quickly to the portion 
of the system under attack and take remedial actions to mitigate the effects of the attack, in this 













Figure 53 - CPSA main interface under normal operation for Test Case B System 
 
 






Figure 55 - Simulation of a bad command by the operator at the control center. 
 
 
Figure 56 - CPSA visualization capturing lines 32-37 under attack and the communication 
channels used to access the breakers connected to transmission lines 32-37.  
 
The plot shows the comparison between the baseline case on the left and the bad command case 




7.2. Cyber Threat Capability Analysis   
The threat capability metric keeps the historical details of suspicious threats, such as a 
malicious source or destination IP, and altered data or commands, as shown in  
Table 11 below. 
Table 11 - Threat Capability Matrix 
 
 
The co-simulator also maintains event logs of the activities performed at the intermediate routers, 
substation RTUs, and control center. A sample event log at an intermediate router is shown in 
Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5: Event logs maintained at the intermediate routers 
 
Efficient and accurate maintenance of logs equips the operator with adequate historical data to 
perform a compare and contrast analysis of current events in real-time with past events and helps 





7.3. Performance Analysis  
We developed an experimental setup with a CPSA co-simulator that was implemented 
through multiple platforms, namely GridSim, JADE, MATLAB, and PowerWorld, to simulate 
power monitoring and control and cyber-physical attack scenarios between the control center and 
the substation RTUs. The C37.118 protocol format was adopted to implement data communication 
through message passing in the co-simulator.  
 
7.4. Overhead 
The overhead generated by the proposed approach includes packet scans and deep packet 




The proposed approach can detect single as well as multiple malicious commands targeting 
power system components. In this dissertation research, we simulated and tested our approach on 
24-substation systems, with each substation having its own dedicated RTU. However, the co-
simulator can be used to test much larger systems with more substations and hundreds of buses.  
 
7.6. Robustness 
In general, the robustness of the co-simulator depends on the ability of the IDS to flag 
malicious commands as suspicious.  Even if the IDS does not detect a malicious command and the 
command is executed on the real system, our approach can detect the power system disturbance 
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and report the effect to the operator, who can take appropriate actions (such as sending other 
control commands) to diminish the impact of the malicious command.  
 
7.7. Execution and Response Time 
The co-simulator simulates normal operations for 8 time steps by using the current-day next 
8 minutes load forecast. Each time step represents a one-minute interval, and the generated output 
for each iteration is stored in a file. The co-simulator runs faster than real-time in the sense that 
during real-time operation, the system compares the actual output against the simulated output 
parameters (AMWCO and other system metrics of measurements). Our co-simulator generates 
each output file in less than three seconds, which is important in ensuring a fast response time of 
the power system operator. 
 
7.8. Limitations 
The limitation of the proposed approach is that it has been tested only by using single and 
sequential malicious attacks. The proposed approach does not currently support the detection of 
coordinated attacks. 
 
7.9. Contributions and Conclusion  
The contributions of the cyber-physical security assessment tool are highlighted below. 
 
1. The developed tool helps power system operators better learn about and understand the nature 
of cyber-physical attacks, specifically bad command injection attacks targeting critical bulk 
electric system components. 
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2. The tool provides a broad understanding of different network topologies to improve our analysis 
of communication network parameter settings for the bulk electric power systems.  
3. The tool supports our understanding and evaluation of power system functions and routine 
operations, such as power flow and contingency analysis.  
5. The tool helps us/analysts monitor and evaluate the impact of cyber-physical attacks on the 
physical power system. This provides a greater understanding of the impact on individual power 
components as well as on the power system as a whole. The tool maintains communication logs, 
received and sent power system measurement data, and triggered control commands. It also 
generates security metrics that pinpoint the critical and non-critical components in the system.  
6. The tool will help operators make appropriate control decisions by simulating the impact of 
potentially malicious commands on the power system in real-time. It will enable operators to 
further develop their decision-making skills.  
In conclusion, the work presented in this chapter describes an approach that uses a novel co-
simulator to help us understand the potential impact of malicious command-based cyber-attacks 
on a power system. The generated output files, metrics, and graphs help the operator to understand 
changes in power system behavior in the presence of cyber-attacks. The detection of a malicious 
command takes place in real-time, which allows the operator to quickly respond to protect the 
system from malicious events in order to prevent cascading failures and eventually blackouts. In 
the future, the co-simulator can be used to test significantly larger power systems, those with a 
large number of communication network nodes. Further work in this area will extend the proposed 











8.1. Discussion of Contributions  
Currently, an operator at the control center can monitor power system line outages and other 
power system events. However, the operator has no knowledge of the cyber-physical security of 
the system. An adversary can perform cyber-attacks over the communication network to alter the 
transmitted measurement data or the critical commands, and in most cases, the operator will be 
unable to detect the attacks. Therefore, we need smarter tools and techniques to detect cyber-
physical attacks over the bulk electric system. In this dissertation, we (1) developed algorithms 
that capture how bad data injection attacks propagate in a power delivery system, (2) developed a 
tool that models a bad command injection in bulk electric systems, and (3) developed a cyber-
physical metric for quantifying the effect of a cyber-physical attack on bulk electric systems.  
The first segment, Chapters 1-4 of this dissertation, presents the introduction, literature 
review, and the development of a graph-based attack propagation model that simulates a bad data 
injection attack and executes a heuristic defense strategy by using power system state estimation.. 
The state estimator was used to identify maliciously injected data and adopt physical security 
metrics to select appropriate attack mitigation actions. Visualization from the analysis performed 
by the propagation simulation can guide the operator at the control center to take appropriate action 
to minimize disruption of the physical power system operation due to the bad data injection attack.  
The second segment, Chapters 5-7, explained the development, prototyping, testing, and 
evaluating of a co-simulator tool capable of modeling and simulating the effects of a cyber-
physical attack such as a bad command injection attack and proposed recommendations for 
countermeasures against such attacks. The co-simulation involved a combined modeling of the 
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communications network (cyber layer) and the bulk electric system (power layer). Chapter 
5proposed a system architecture covering the functional requirements and system modules of the 
developed co-simulator and described the dependencies and implementation of the co-simulator 
by using Java, MATLAB, and PowerWorld. The developed co-simulator supports the transmission 
of measurement data through polling request and response, triggering a control command to a 
power component deployed at a substation, and updating the power system values: voltage, active 
power, reactive power, and angle. We adopted the Aggregated Megawatt Contingency Overload 
(AMWCO) as the cyber-physical security metrics to quantify and qualify the real-time 
performance of the bulk power transmission system during a bad command injection attack. The 
second segment of the dissertation research makes three main contributions: 
1. It models a bad command injection cyber-physical attack on the operation of a 24-bus bulk 
power transmission system through co-simulation. 
2. It quantifies the cyber-physical security of the test system under a cyber-physical attack in 
real-time. 
3. It increases operator situational awareness of system-level cyber-physical security.  
The first contribution above explores modeling a bad command injection attack and studying the 
effect(s) of the attack on power system functions such as state estimation and contingency analysis. 
The second contribution explores using a cyber-physical security metric known as the Aggregated 
MegaWatt Contingency Overload (AMWCO) to capture the effect of overloading transmission 
lines as a result of a bad command injection attack. The third contribution of the dissertation 
addresses the visualization of the effects of the cyber-physical security attack. A novel process 
user interface was designed to capture the spatiotemporal dynamics of the bulk power system 
under the bad command injection attack. Currently, electric utility operators at the control center 
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do not have the means of quantifying and visualizing the effects of an on-going cyber-physical 
security attack. To potentially solve this problem, this dissertation work created a software tool 
that is intended to help utilities not only gain a better understanding of how the system behaves 
during a bad command injection attack but also be able to take the appropriate countermeasures to 
mitigate the effects of the attack. This software tool will improve operator training regarding 
cybersecurity by strengthening their awareness and understanding of the power system’s behavior 
in the presence of potential cyber-attacks. It will also enable the operator to further develop their 
decision-making skills. 
 
8.2. Future Work  
Insights gained from the work presented in this dissertation can be useful for exploring the 
following future research directions of coordinated cyber-physical attacks in bulk electric systems:  
1. Modeling and simulating multiple bad data injection attacks from several substations. 
2. Modeling and simulating multiple bad command injection attacks that simultaneously 
disconnect a line and a generator. 
3. Modeling and simulating N-1 RTU Contingency Analysis. Traditionally, contingency analysis 
has involved N-1 contingency analysis for transmission lines. This work can be extended to 
consider N-1 contingency analysis for RTUs. RTUs disabled as a result of a cyber-physical 
security attack can create severe observability problems in bulk electric systems and lead to a 
blackout. Hence, insights gained from this dissertation can help create a formulation and 
solution methodology for mitigating the effects of a cyber-physical security attack that results 






[1] F. C. Schweppe and D. B. Rom, “Power System Static-State Estimation, Part II: 
Approximate Model,” IEEE Trans. Power Appar. Syst., vol. PAS-89, no. 1, pp. 125–130, 
1970. 
[2] “Communications network solutions for smart grids Smart,” Siemens AG Infrastruct. 
Cities Sect., 2011. 
[3] M. C. Sorebo, Gilbert N. and Echols, An End-To-End View of Security in the New 
Electrical Grid, 1st ed. Boca Raton, 2011. 
[4] G. Flisberg, “Global Trends in Bulk Power Transmission,” 1970. 
[5] IEEE, C37.1-1987 - IEEE Standard Definition , Specification , and Analysis of Systems 
Used for Supervisory Control , Data Acquisition , and Automatic Control, vol. 1994. 
1987. 
[6] “SCADA Systems for Electrical Distribution,” Electrical Technology. [Online]. 
Available: https://www.electricaltechnology.org/2015/09/scada-systems-for-electrical-
distribution.html. 
[7] “SCADA RTU’s.” [Online]. Available: http://members.iinet.net.au/~ianw/rtu.html. 
[Accessed: 01-Jan-2017]. 
[8] R. Carlson, “Sandia SCADA Program High-Security SCADA LDRD Final Report,” 
Prod.Sandia.Gov, no. April, 2002. 
[9] D. J. Gaushell and H. T. Darlington, “Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.,” Proc. 
IEEE, vol. 75, no. 12, pp. 1645–1658, 1987. 
[10] W. J. Ackerman and W. R. Block, “Understanding supervisory systems,” Comput. Appl. 
Power, IEEE, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 37–40, 1992. 
[11] J. Lloyd, “Security hardened remote terminal units for SCADA networks,” 2008. 
[12] J. Jayasamraj, “SCADA Communication & Protocols,” pp. 1–8. 
[13] D. Laird, “Substation SCADA- Small, Medium, or Large?” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.hallam-ics.com/blog/substation-scada-small-medium-or-large-. 
[14] M. Berg and J. Stamp, “A Reference Model for Control and Automation Systems in 
Electric Power,” Sandia Natl. Lab. Rep., no. SAND2005–1000C, pp. 1–7, 2005. 
[15] V. H. Nguyen, T. Tran-Quoc, and Y. Besanger, “SCADA as a service approach for 
133 
 
interoperability of micro-grid platforms,” Sustain. Energy, Grids Networks, vol. 8, pp. 26–
36, 2016. 
[16] E. Csanyi, “3 generations of SCADA system architectures you should know about.” 
[Online]. Available: http://electrical-engineering-portal.com/three-generations-of-scada-
system-architectures. 
[17] T. Agarwal, “Know all about SCADA Systems Architecture and Types with 
Applications.” [Online]. Available: http://www.edgefxkits.com/blog/scada-system-
architecture-types-applications/. 
[18] M. D. Hadley and K. A. Huston, “AGA-12 , Part 2 Performance Test Results,” no. 
August, 2007. 
[19] A. Abur and A. Gómez Expósito, Power System State Estimation: Theory and 
Implementation, vol. 24. CRC Press, 2004. 
[20] K. P. Lien, C. W. Liu, C. S. Yu, and J. A. Jiang, “Transmission network fault location 
observability with minimal PMU placement,” IEEE Trans. Power Deliv., vol. 21, no. 3, 
pp. 1128–1136, 2006. 
[21] U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, “Final Report on the August 14, 2003 
Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,” System, no. 
April, p. 238, 2004. 
[22] A. Ashok and M. Govindarasu, “Cyber attacks on power system state estimation through 
topology errors,” IEEE Power Energy Soc. Gen. Meet., pp. 1–8, 2012. 
[23] J. Jiang and Y. Qian, “Defense Mechanisms against Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grid 
Networks,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 10, pp. 76–82, 2017. 
[24] R. Tsang, “Cyberthreats, vulnerabilities and attacks on SCADA networks,” Univ. 
California, Berkeley, Work. Pap. …, pp. 1–23, 2010. 
[25] R. Langner, “Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon,” IEEE Secur. Priv., vol. 9, no. 
3, pp. 49–51, 2011. 
[26] R. M. Lee, M. J. Assante, and T. Conway, “Analysis of the cyber attack on the Ukrainian 
power grid,” SANS Ind. Control Syst., p. 23, 2016. 
[27] ICSA-11-231-01 - Inductive Automation Ignition Information Disclosure Vulnerability, 
4th ed. Butterworth-Heinemann. 
[28] “NIST 800-82, "Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and 
134 
 
Industrial Control System Security.” . 
[29] E. Mills, “Details of the first-ever control system malware.” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.cnet.com/news/details-of-the-first-ever-control-system-malware-faq/. 
[30] Siemens, “SIMATIC WinCC / SIMATIC PCS 7: Information about Malware / Viruses / 
Trojan horses,” 2011. [Online]. Available: 
https://support.industry.siemens.com/cs/document/43876783/simatic-wincc-simatic-pcs-
7%3A-information-about-malware-viruses-trojan-horses?dti=0&lc=en-WW. 
[31] R. McMilan, “Siemens: Stuxnet worm hit inddustrial systems,” 2010. 
[32] P. Oman, E. Schweitzer, and J. Roberts, “Safeguarding IEDs, substations, and SCADA 
systems against electronic intrusions,” 2001 West. Power Deliv. Autom. Conf., no. April 
2001, pp. 1–18, 2001. 
[33] P. IEEE Power and Energy, “The Utility and Grid of the Future. What will it bring?,” vol. 
14, no. 5, 2016. 
[34] E. Smith et al., “Going beyond cybersecurity compliance,” IEEE Power Energy Mag., 
vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 48–56, 2016. 
[35] R. Maynor and R. Graham, “SCADA Security and Terrorism: We are not Crying Wolf,” 
2006. [Online]. Available: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-federal-06/BH-
Fed-06-Maynor-Graham-up.pdf. 
[36] R. Lemos, “SCADA system makers pushed toward security,” 2006. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.securityfocus.com/news/11402. 
[37] M. K. Reiter, “False Data Injection Attacks against State Estimation in,” pp. 21–32, 2009. 
[38] S. Sridhar and G. Manimaran, “Data Integrity Attack and its Impacts on Voltage Control 
Loop in Power Grid,” pp. 0–5, 2011. 
[39] O. Kosut, L. J. L. Jia, R. J. Thomas, and L. T. L. Tong, “Malicious Data Attacks on Smart 
Grid State Estimation: Attack Strategies and Countermeasures,” Smart Grid Commun. 
(SmartGridComm), 2010 First IEEE Int. Conf., pp. 1–6, 2010. 
[40] E. Bompard, C. Gao, R. Napoli, A. Russo, M. Masera, and A. Stefanini, “Risk Assessment 
of Malicious Attacks Against Power Systems,” vol. 39, no. 5, pp. 1074–1085, 2009. 
[41] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against state estimation in 
electric power grids,” Ccs, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1–33, 2009. 
[42] G. Hug and J. A. Giampapa, “Vulnerability assessment of AC state estimation with 
135 
 
respect to false data injection cyber-attacks,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 
1362–1370, 2012. 
[43] A. Rahman and H. Mohsenian-rad, “False Data Injection Attacks Against Nonlinear State 
Estimation in Smart Power Grids,” no. 1, pp. 1–5. 
[44] J. Kim, L. Tong, and R. J. Thomas, “Dynamic Attacks on Power Systems Economic 
Dispatch.” 
[45] M. A. Rahman and E. Al-shaer, “Impact Analysis of Topology Poisoning Attacks on 
Economic Operation of the Smart Power Grid.” 
[46] M. Farajollahi, S. H. Hosseini, and A. Safdarian, “Bad Data Injection as a Threat for 
Power System Security,” no. Sgc, pp. 23–24, 2015. 
[47] S. D. Antonio, L. Coppolino, and I. A. Elia, “Security Issues of a Phasor Data 
Concentrator for Smart Grid Infrastructure,” pp. 3–8, 2005. 
[48] L. Xie, Y. Mo, S. Member, and B. Sinopoli, “Integrity Data Attacks in Power Market 
Operations,” vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 659–666, 2011. 
[49] A. Giani, E. Bitar, M. Garcia, and M. Mcqueen, “Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks : 
Characterizations and Countermeasures π,” no. 025478, pp. 232–237, 2011. 
[50] H. Sandberg, “Stealth Attacks and Protection Schemes for State Estimators in Power 
Systems,” pp. 214–219, 2010. 
[51] F. Pasqualetti, D. Florian, and F. Bullo, “Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Networks : 
Models , Fundamental Limitations and Monitor Design,” pp. 2195–2201, 2011. 
[52] A. Teixeira, S. Amin, H. Sandberg, K. H. Johansson, and S. S. Sastry, “Cyber security 
analysis of state estimators in electric power systems,” Proc. 49th IEEE Conf. Decis. 
Control, pp. 5991–5998, 2010. 
[53] H. Sandberg and H. Johansson, “A Cyber Security Study of a SCADA Energy 
Management System : Stealthy Deception Attacks on the State Estimator,” no. August, pp. 
1–11, 2010. 
[54] N. M. Manousakis and G. N. Korres, “Optimal PMU Placement for Numerical 
Observability Considering Fixed Channel Capacity-A Semidefinite Programming 
Approach,” IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 3328–3329, 2016. 
[55] T. T. Kim and H. V. Poor, “Strategic Protection Against Data Injection Attacks on Power 
Grids,” vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 326–333, 2011. 
136 
 
[56] S. Bi, Y. Jun, A. Zhang, and S. Member, “Graphical Methods for Defense Against False-
Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation,” vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 1216–1227, 
2014. 
[57] “NERC-CIP, Critical Infrastructure Protection,” North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx. [Accessed: 02-Sep-2018]. 
[58] “Mandatory Reliability Standards for Critical Infrastructure Protection,” Fed. Energy 
Regul. Commision, vol. 215, no. 706, 2008. 
[59] North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), “Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Standards,” 2014. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx. 
[60] AGA, “Cryptographic Protection of SCADA Communications. Part 1: Background, 
Policies and Test Plan,” Am. Gas, no. 12, pp. 1–123, 2006. 
[61] J. Eisenhauer, P. Donnelly, M. Ellis, and M. O’Brien, “Roadmap to Secure Control 
Systems in the Energy Sector,” 2006. 
[62] “National Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).” [Online]. Available: 
http://energy.sandia.gov/energy/ssrei/gridmod/cyber-security-for-electric-
infrastructure/scada-systems/. 
[63] “No Title.” [Online]. Available: https://www.hartcomm2.org/frontpage/wirelesshart.html. 
[64] “SCADA Hacking: The Key Differences between Security of SCADA and Traditional IT 
systems.” . 
[65] D. Dolezilek, K. Carson, K. Leech, K. Streett, and ., “Secure SCADA and Engineering 
Access Communications: A Case Study of Private and Public Communication Link 
Security,” Schweitzer Eng. Lab., p. , 2006. 
[66] J. Abshier, “10 Principles for securing control systems,” Control, vol. 18, no. 10, pp. 77–
81, 2005. 
[67] J. D. Fernandez and A. E. Fernandez, “SCADA systems: Vulnerabilities and 
remediation,” J. Comput. Sci. Coll., vol. 20, pp. 160–168, 2005. 
[68] D. Geer, “Security of critical control systems sparks concern,” Computer (Long. Beach. 
Calif)., vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 20–23, 2006. 
[69] M. Munir, F. Parisi-Presicce, and W. Duminda, “DNPsec: A Secure Framework for DNP3 
137 
 
in SCADA systemsDNPsec: A Secure Framework for DNP3 in SCADA systems,” in 
International Joint Conference on Computer Information and Systems Sciences and 
Engineering, 2005. 
[70] M. . McDonald, G. . Conrad, T. C. Service, and R. . Cassidy, “Cyber Effects Analysis 
using VCSE,” Albuquerque, NM, USA. 
[71] D. C. Bergman, D. Jin, D. M. Nicol, and T. Yardley, “The virtual power system testbed 
and inter-testbed integration,” Proc. 2nd Conf. Cyber Secur. Exp. test, no. August, p. 5, 
2009. 
[72] V. Salehi, A. Mohamed, A. Mazloomzadeh, and O. A. Mohammed, “Laboratory-based 
smart power system, part I: Design and system development,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, 
vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1394–1404, 2012. 
[73] V. Salehi, A. Mohamed, A. Mazloomzadeh, and O. A. Mohammed, “Laboratory-based 
smart power system, part II: Control, monitoring, and protection,” IEEE Trans. Smart 
Grid, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1405–1417, 2012. 
[74] M. Mallouhi, Y. Al-Nashif, D. Cox, T. Chadaga, and S. Hariri, “A testbed for analyzing 
security of SCADA control systems (TASSCS),” IEEE PES Innov. Smart Grid Technol. 
Conf. Eur. ISGT Eur., pp. 1–7, 2011. 
[75] J. Hong et al., “An intrusion and defense testbed in a cyber-power system environment,” 
IEEE Power Energy Soc. Gen. Meet., pp. 1–5, 2011. 
[76] C. Queiroz, A. Mahmood, and Z. Tari, “SCADASimA framework for building SCADA 
simulations,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 589–597, 2011. 
[77] M. Thomas and E. Al, “A CONTROL SYSTEM TESTBED TO VALIDATE CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION CONCEPTS,” Ceps, no. December, pp. 12–13, 
2011. 
[78] J. Mirkovic and T. Benzel, “Teaching cybersecurity with DeterLab,” IEEE Secur. Priv., 
vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 73–76, 2012. 
[79] A. Hahn, A. Ashok, S. Sridhar, and M. Govindarasu, “Cyber-physical security testbeds: 
Architecture, application, and evaluation for smart grid,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 4, 
no. 2, pp. 847–855, 2013. 
[80] B. Chen, K. L. Butler-Purry, A. Goulart, and D. Kundur, “Implementing a real-time cyber-
physical system test bed in RTDS and OPNET,” 2014 North Am. Power Symp. NAPS 
138 
 
2014, pp. 1–6, 2014. 
[81] B. Chen, N. Pattanaik, A. Goulart, K. L. Butler-Purry, and D. Kundur, “Implementing 
attacks for modbus/TCP protocol in a real-time cyber physical system test bed,” Proc. - 
CQR 2015 2015 IEEE Int. Work. Tech. Comm. Commun. Qual. Reliab., 2015. 
[82] C. B. Vellaithurai, S. S. Biswas, and A. K. Srivastava, “Development and Application of a 
Real-Time Test Bed for Cyber&amp;#x02013;Physical System,” IEEE Syst. J., vol. 11, 
no. 4, pp. 1–12, 2015. 
[83] S. S. Biswas, F. Shariatzadeh, R. Beckstrom, and A. K. Srivastava, “Real time testing and 
validation of Smart Grid devices and algorithms,” IEEE Power Energy Soc. Gen. Meet., 
2013. 
[84] B. A. Vaccaro, M. Popov, D. Villacci, and V. Terzija, “An Integrated Framework for 
Smart Microgrids Modeling , Communication , and Verification,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 99, no. 
1, pp. 119–132, 2011. 
[85] G. Koutsandria, R. Gentz, M. Jamei, A. Scaglione, S. Peisert, and C. McParland, “A Real-
Time Testbed Environment for Cyber-Physical Security on the Power Grid,” Proc. First 
ACM Work. Cyber-Physical Syst. and/or Priv. - CPS-SPC ’15, pp. 67–78, 2015. 
[86] “Test Bed for a Cyber-Physical System Based on Integration of Advanced Power 
Laboratory and eXtensible Messaging.” [Online]. Available: 
https://www.ece.cmu.edu/∼electriconf/posterpdf_2015/Matin_Meskin%0APoster.pdf. 
[87] Y. Yang et al., “Cybersecurity test-bed for IEC 61850 based smart substations,” IEEE 
Power Energy Soc. Gen. Meet., vol. 2015–Septe, pp. 1–5, 2015. 
[88] “INEL Test Range, Protecting Nation’s Infrastructure.” [Online]. Available: 
http://www4vip.inl.gov/research/%0Aidaho-test-range/d/idaho-test-range.pdf. 
[89] N. Saxena, V. Chukwuka, L. Xiong, and S. Grijalva, “CPSA : A Cyber-Physical Security 
Assessment Tool for Situational Awareness in Smart Grid,” pp. 69–79, 2017. 
[90] B. Y. Mo et al., “Cyber – Physical Security of a Smart Grid Infrastructure,” Proc. IEEE, 
vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 195–209, 2012. 
[91] C. W. Ten, G. Manimaran, and C. C. Liu, “Cybersecurity for critical infrastructures: 
Attack and defense modeling,” IEEE Trans. Syst. Man, Cybern. Part ASystems Humans, 
vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 853–865, 2010. 
[92] Y. Yang et al., “Man-in-the-middle attack test-bed investigating cyber-security 
139 
 
vulnerabilities in smart grid SCADA systems,” Int. Conf. Sustain. Power Gener. Supply 
(SUPERGEN 2012), no. July, pp. 138–138, 2012. 
[93] J. Wei and D. Kundur, “A flocking-based model for DoS-resilient communication routing 
in smart grid,” GLOBECOM - IEEE Glob. Telecommun. Conf., pp. 3519–3524, 2012. 
[94] T. T. Tran, O. S. Shin, and J. H. Lee, “Detection of replay attacks in smart grid systems,” 
2013 Int. Conf. Comput. Manag. Telecommun. ComManTel 2013, pp. 298–302, 2013. 
[95] P. Y. Chen, S. M. Cheng, and K. C. Chen, “Smart attacks in smart grid communication 
networks,” IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 50, no. 8, pp. 24–29, 2012. 
[96] A. Abur and G. Exposito, Power System State Estimation: Theory and Implementation. 
New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, 2004. 
[97] P. Kundur, N. . Balu, and M. . Lauby, Power System Stability and Control, Vol 4, . New 
York: Mcgraw-hill, 1994. 
[98] Y. Sun and T. J. Overbye, “Visualizations for power system contingency analysis data,” 
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 1859–1866, 2004. 
[99] C. Vellaithurai, A. Srivastava, S. Zonouz, and R. Berthier, “CPIndex: Cyber-physical 
vulnerability assessment for power-grid infrastructures,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 6, 
no. 2, pp. 566–575, 2015. 
[100] S. Zonouz, A. Houmansadr, and P. Haghani, “EliMet: Security metric elicitation in power 
grid critical infrastructures by observing system administrators’ responsive behavior,” 
Proc. Int. Conf. Dependable Syst. Networks, 2012. 
[101] “Suricata - Open source network threat detection engine.” [Online]. Available: 
https://suricata-ids.org. 
[102] “Interoperability and cyber security plan, nreca crn smart grid regional demonstration, 
grant de-oe-0000222.” 
[103] N. Saxena and S. Grijalva, “Dynamic Secrets and Secret Keys Based Scheme for Securing 
Last Mile Smart Grid Wireless Communication,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Informatics, vol. 13, 
no. 3, pp. 1482–1491, 2017. 
[104] R. Kinney, P. Crucitti, R. Albert, and V. Latora, “Modeling cascading failures in the North 
American power grid,” Eur. Phys. J. B, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 101–107, 2005. 
[105] M. Vaiman et al., “Risk assessment of cascading outages: Methodologies and challenges,” 
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 631–641, 2012. 
140 
 
[106] S. Arianos, E. Bompard, A. Carbone, and F. Xue, “Power grids vulnerability: a complex 
network approach,” pp. 1–16, 2008. 
[107] T. Liu, Y. Gu, D. Wang, Y. Gui, and X. Guan, “A novel method to detect bad data 
injection attack in smart grid,” 2013 Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, pp. 3423–3428, 2013. 
[108] A. Ashok, M. Govindarasu, and V. Ajjarapu, “Online Detection of Stealthy False Data 
Injection Attacks in Power System State Estimation,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 3053, 
no. c, pp. 1–1, 2016. 
[109] S. Li, Y. Yilmaz, and X. Wang, “Quickest Detection of False Data Injection Attack in 
Wide-Area Smart Grids,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 2725–2735, 2015. 
[110] L. Wang, T. Islam, T. Long, A. Singhal, and S. Jajodia, “An attack graph-based 
probabilistic security metric,” Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. (including Subser. Lect. Notes 
Artif. Intell. Lect. Notes Bioinformatics), vol. 5094 LNCS, pp. 283–296, 2008. 
[111] T. Base and T. Base, “Common Vulnerability Scoring System v3 . 0 Examples,” no. July, 
pp. 1–38, 2016. 
[112] J. Davis and S. Magrath, “A Survey of Cyber Ranges and Testbeds,” p. 29, 2013. 
[113] R. Buyya and M. Murshed, “GridSim: a toolkit for the modeling and simulation of 
distributed resource management and scheduling for Grid computing,” Concurr. Comput. 
Pract. Exp., vol. 14, no. 13–15, pp. 1175–1220, 2002. 
[114] R. Roche, S. Natarajan, A. Bhattacharyya, and S. Suryanarayanan, “A framework for co-
simulation of AI tools with power systems analysis software,” Proc. - Int. Work. Database 
Expert Syst. Appl. DEXA, pp. 350–354, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
